MIR IN PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)

9/17/2014 1:42 PM

Notes
WINDSOR AND ITS DISCONTENTS: STATE
INCOME TAX IMPLICATIONS FOR SAME-SEX
COUPLES
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ABSTRACT
In United States v. Windsor, the Supreme Court struck down
section three of the federal Defense of Marriage Act. Shortly
thereafter, the Internal Revenue Service issued a ruling under which
all married same-sex couples will be treated as married for federal tax
purposes. The IRS Ruling raised a host of state taxation issues for
lawfully married same-sex taxpayers residing in nonrecognition states,
given that nearly all states conform to the federal tax system to some
degree so as to minimize taxpayers’ calculations, record-keeping, and
compliance burdens.
This Note explores the impact of the post-Windsor IRS Ruling on
the taxation of same-sex couples in states that do not recognize samesex marriage yet require taxpayers to reference their federal tax
returns when completing their state tax returns. It details the tax filing
approaches adopted by affected states and the disparate state and
federal tax treatments faced by the majority of married same-sex
couples domiciled in a nonrecognition state. Finally, this Note
concludes with a discussion of the constitutional- and administrativelaw challenges that married same-sex taxpayers can raise against state
tax policies that result in discriminatory treatment of same-sex
marriage at the state level.
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INTRODUCTION
On June 26, 2013, the Supreme Court decision in United States v.
1
Windsor overturned section three of the federal Defense of Marriage
2
Act (DOMA). Much of the commentary surrounding Windsor
focused on the theme of marriage equality and federal recognition of
3
same-sex marriages. But Windsor, arguably one of the most
important civil rights cases of this generation, is at its heart a case
4
about the discriminatory tax treatment of married same-sex couples.
The Court held unconstitutional the unequal treatment of married
same-sex couples on the federal level. However, Windsor did not
provide a roadmap of what should happen under the numerous
federal statutes in which marital status plays a key role, including tax
5
statutes, thus creating great uncertainty regarding the federal tax
treatment of married same-sex couples.
On August 29, 2013, the U.S. Department of Treasury
(Treasury) and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) announced a
Revenue Ruling (IRS Ruling) implementing the federal tax aspects of
6
the Supreme Court decision in Windsor. Under the IRS Ruling, each
legally married same-sex couple is treated as married for federal tax
purposes, even if the couple is domiciled in a state that does not
7
recognize the marriage.
Since its issuance, the IRS Ruling has created difficulties for
those states that do not recognize the marriages of their same-sex
residents (nonrecognition states). Nearly all states reference the
federal tax code at some point, and in most states, the taxpayer’s

1. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
2. Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), Pub. L. No. 104–199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996)
(codified at 1 U.S.C. § 7 and 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2012)).
3. See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Bolsters Gay Marriage with Two Major Rulings,
N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 2013, at A1 (referring to United States v. Windsor as a “major victor[y] for
the gay rights movement”).
4. Edith Windsor sought a refund of $363,053 paid in federal estate taxes on a transfer of
property from her deceased same-sex spouse to herself, the surviving spouse. If they had been a
married opposite-sex couple, no estate taxes would have been owed. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2683
(2013).
5. See infra note 29 and accompanying text.
6. Rev. Rul. 2013-17, 2013-38 I.R.B 201. A Revenue Ruling is an official pronouncement
applying the Internal Revenue Code to a particular set of facts. Revenue Rulings may be cited
as precedent but are not final and conclusive. WILLIAM A. RAABE, GERALD E. WHITTENBURG
& DEBRA L. SANDERS, FEDERAL TAX RESEARCH 513 (9th ed. 2011).
7. Id.

MIR IN PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

9/17/2014 1:42 PM

WINDSOR AND ITS DISCONTENTS
8

55
9

federal “taxable income” or “adjusted gross income” (AGI) serves
10
as the starting point for calculating state income taxes. For example,
a basic tax distinction for income tax purposes is the taxpayer’s
marital status. However, this distinction can be a complicated
question for same-sex couples. Legally married same-sex couples face
problems of recognition and classification; for instance, they may be
married (in the federal government’s eyes or in New York’s, for
11
example), or unmarried (in North Carolina’s eyes, for example).
Tax policy is an area in which federal and state operations tend
to be closely intertwined. Professor Ruth Mason, who explores
federal-state income tax conformity in a recent article, points out that
12
federal tax policies reflect national, not state, political preferences.
Mason argues that conforming state income tax laws to the federal
13
model leads to an indirect adoption of federal policy choices. At the
same time, the significant costs associated with decoupling from the
federal income tax regime can deter states from deviating from the
14
federal base. The IRS Ruling thus radically alters the federal income
tax regime for married same-sex couples and raises new questions
with respect to federal-state tax-base conformity.
This Note explores the impact of the post-Windsor IRS Ruling
on the taxation of married same-sex couples in states that do not
recognize same-sex marriage, but have a state tax base that conforms
to the federal tax base. The IRS Ruling has prompted these states to
adjust their tax rules, regulations, and policies. Some of these states
have been able to provide new rules for same-sex taxpayers
administratively, while others likely will need to amend state
legislation mandating federal-state tax-base conformity. This Note
surveys the guidance given to married same-sex couples by

8. Taxable income, generally speaking, is an individual’s gross income, less any allowable
tax deductions (such as medical expenses and property taxes). I.R.C. § 63 (2012).
9. Adjusted gross income is defined as gross income minus adjustments to income (such as
student-loan interest payments and IRA contributions). See I.R.C. § 62 (2012).
10. Thirty-six states start with the federal AGI, federal gross income, or federal taxable
income and then apply either one flat rate or their own graduated rates, and in some cases, their
own income tax brackets. For a discussion of the potential issues related to conformity and a list
of states affected, see infra Part II.B.
11. For a list of states that recognize same-sex marriage, see infra Table 1 and
accompanying text.
12. Ruth Mason, Delegating Up: State Conformity with the Federal Tax Base, 62 DUKE L.J.
1267, 1297 (2013).
13. Id.
14. Id. at 1272.
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nonrecognition states in the wake of the IRS Ruling, providing a
15
snapshot of state income tax policy in a rapidly changing field. In
exploring the tax filing approaches states have adopted for same-sex
couples, it contends that these tax policies could be challenged on
both constitutional- and administrative-law grounds.
Part I sketches the tax landscape for married same-sex couples
before Windsor and the IRS Ruling, on both federal and state levels.
Part II describes the IRS Ruling and the implications for state income
tax systems, particularly the disruptive impact on federal-state taxbase conformity. Part II also outlines the potential costs and benefits
associated with conformity to the federal tax base, acknowledging
that states are unlikely to elect to decouple from the federal tax base
in response to the IRS Ruling. Part III introduces the paradigmatic
approaches adopted by states affected by the IRS Ruling and
explores the application and economic effects in hypothetical test
cases. Finally, Part IV sets forth the constitutional and procedural
concerns associated with these newly adopted state approaches, such
as challenges based on state administrative-rulemaking procedures
and on Fourteenth Amendment equal protection principles. While
discussions about tax law and policy often focus primarily on federal
law, this Note argues that state tax law offers unique opportunities to
study the constitutional and administrative issues associated with the
conflicting treatment of same-sex marriage among different states,
and between states and the federal government. Indeed,
discriminatory tax treatment of same-sex marriage on the state level
is a viable avenue that same-sex marriage advocates might explore
when framing challenges to state bans on same-sex marriage.
I. BACKGROUND
Of the numerous statutory provisions that rely on a
16
determination of marital status, tax provisions are often overlooked

15. In August 2013, the Tax Foundation produced a map of states that were impacted by
the IRS Ruling. Nick Kasprak, State of Celebration, TAX FOUNDATION BLOG (Aug. 29, 2013),
http://taxfoundation.org/blog/state-celebration. At the time, there were twenty-four states with a
ban on same-sex marriage and an income tax coupled to the federal income tax system. As of
September 5, 2014, twenty-one states banned same-sex marriage while conforming to the
federal tax system. See infra note 93 and accompanying text. This is therefore a constantly
developing topic.
16. According to the U.S. General Accounting Office, there are 1,138 federal statutory
provisions that rely on a determination of marital status. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
GAO-04-353R, DEFENSE OF MARRIAGE ACT: UPDATE TO PRIOR REPORT (Jan. 23, 2004),
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outside of tax academia. Any discussion of tax law must begin with an
acknowledgment that tax preferences reflect societal preferences and
are “part of a larger ‘blueprint for the aims and ambitions of the
17
nation state.’” In this way, tax law and policy can reflect and
reinforce disparities and inequalities based on race or ethnicity,
18
socioeconomic status, gender, and sexual orientation. The Internal
Revenue Code (the Code) might appear to be neutral, but this
obscures the normative choices and value judgments underlying tax
policy. The tax system is not limited to raising revenue, but serves
19
regulatory and social-welfare functions as well. Tax commentators
have argued that embedded within tax provisions are historical
preferences in favor of procreation and the so-called traditional
20
family. For example, only married couples with disproportionate
incomes (that is, traditional couples with one principal wage earner)
21
tend to be eligible for the marriage bonus. Because of this, some
commentators have argued that Congress structured the tax system to
incentivize women to undertake conventional household roles and to
22
discourage them from entering the wage-labor market. Indeed,
politicians have embraced such marriage-promotion aspects of tax

available
at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GAOREPORTS-GAO-04-353R/pdf/
GAOREPORTS-GAO-04-353R.pdf.
17. Nancy J. Knauer, Critical Tax Policy: A Pathway to Reform?, 9 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y
(forthcoming 2014), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2304378; see also Anthony C. Infanti,
Tax Reform Discourse, 32 VA. TAX. REV. 205, 254–55 (2012) (stating that tax preferences are a
reflection of society and describing how American tax law reflects cultural preferences such as
privileging homeownership).
18. See Anthony C. Infanti & Bridget J. Crawford, Introduction to CRITICAL TAX
THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION, at xxi, xxii (Anthony C. Infanti & Bridget J. Crawford, eds.,
2009) (noting that tax laws “reflect and even reify discrimination based on race, gender, sexual
orientation, class, disability or family structure”).
19. See, e.g., Reuven A. Yonah, The Three Goals of Taxation, 60 TAX L. REV. 1, 3–4 (2006)
(noting that in addition to revenue-raising, taxation also serves redistributive and regulatory
ends); Kristin E. Hickman, Administering the Tax System We Have, 63 DUKE L.J. 1717, 1721–22
(2014) (explaining that raising revenue is no longer the sole focus of the U.S. tax system).
20. E.g., Grace Blumberg, Sexism in the Code: A Comparative Study of Income Taxation of
Working Wives and Mothers, in CRITICAL TAX THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION 3, 3 (Anthony C.
Infanti & Bridget J. Crawford, eds., 2009) (“Close scrutiny of the Code reveals a strong pattern
of work disincentive for married women and inequitable treatment of the two-earner family.”);
EDWARD J. MCCAFFERY, TAXING WOMEN 1 (1997) (“The tax system’s strong bias in favor of
single-earner families now sits uneasily under modern conditions.”).
21. Lawrence Zelenak, Marriage and the Income Tax, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 339, 340–41
(1994).
22. See generally Nancy C. Staudt, Taxing Housework, 84 GEO. L.J. 1571 (1996).
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23

policy. In addition, the importance of traditional notions of marriage
and family in tax laws is evident in the federal DOMA and state
analogs’ privileging of married opposite-sex couples as compared to
married same-sex couples.
This Part describes the federal and state tax landscape for
married same-sex couples pre-Windsor. Section A gives a general
overview of federal tax treatment of same-sex marriage under
DOMA. Section B discusses the impact of DOMA on state taxation
of married same-sex couples in states that recognized same-sex
marriage before section three of DOMA was overturned in June
2013.
A. Pre-Windsor Federal Tax Treatment of Same-Sex Marriage
DOMA was an unusual federal intrusion into an issue previously
24
reserved for the states. In fact, before DOMA’s enactment in 1996,
the federal government had “by history and tradition” relied on the
25
states’ determinations of what constituted marriage. During the
Congressional hearings on DOMA, Professor Cass Sunstein testified
that Congress had never before singled out any marriages for special
federal legislative treatment—not even polygamous marriages,
marriages between minors, incestuous marriages, or bigamous
26
marriages. Section three of DOMA provided the operative
language:

23. For example, President George W. Bush defended his plan to increase marriage
bonuses by saying, “I like to remind people that the tax code ought to encourage marriage, not
discourage marriage.” President George W. Bush, Remarks Following a Discussion on the
National Economy, 1 PUB. PAPERS 241, 243 (Feb. 19, 2004). But see Patricia Cain, DOMA
and the Internal Revenue Code, 84 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 481, 503 (2009) (arguing that the tax code
was never intended as an instrument to benefit married couples).
24. Under the Tenth Amendment to the Constitution, “[t]he powers not delegated to the
United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States
respectively, or to the people.” U.S. CONST. amend X.
25. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2689 (2013); see also Elk Grove Unified Sch.
Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 12 (2004) (“Long ago we observed that ‘[t]he whole subject of the
domestic relations of husband and wife . . . belongs to the laws of the States and not to the laws
of the United States.’” (quoting In re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 593–94 (1890))); Massachusetts v.
U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 698 F. Supp. 2d 234, 236 (D. Mass. 2010) (challenging
DOMA’s constitutionality on the basis that the definition and regulation of marriage is a states’
rights issue).
26. The Defense of Marriage Act: Hearing Before the Comm. on the Judiciary, United States
Senate, on S. 1740 a Bill to Define and Protect the Institution of Marriage, 104th Cong. 44 (1996)
(statement of Prof. Cass Sunstein). But cf. W. Burlette Carter, The “Federal Law of Marriage”:
Deference, Deviation and DOMA, 21 AM. U.J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 705, 736–48 (2013)
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In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or of any ruling,
regulation, or interpretation of the various administrative bureaus
and agencies of the United States, the word “marriage” means only
a legal union between one man and one woman as husband and
wife, and the word “spouse” refers only to a person of the opposite
27
sex who is a husband or a wife.

Thus, DOMA precluded the federal government from
recognizing a same-sex marriage, regardless of the validity of the
marriage under state law.
DOMA impacted numerous federal provisions, including the
28
Code. The federal income tax system uses the married couple as a
29
unit of taxation, and it is DOMA’s definition of marriage that
currently applies to the Code. Therefore, for federal tax purposes,
from 1996 until 2013, marriage was defined as a legal union between
30
one man and one woman. Married same-sex couples were treated as
31
32
legal strangers; their relationship as a “tax nothing.” As a result,
they were neither able to enjoy the tax benefits of marriage nor were
33
they subject to the tax penalties of marriage.

(discussing Congress’s restriction on polygamy as an example of federal deviation from state
determinations of valid marriage).
27. 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2012).
28. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2694 (2013) (“Among the over 1,000 statutes and numerous
federal regulations that DOMA controls are laws pertaining to Social Security, housing, taxes,
criminal sanctions, copyright and veterans’ benefits.”). It appears that the impact on tax law was
barely considered during the congressional hearings leading up to the enactment of DOMA.
Cain, supra note 23, at 492 (noting that no tax experts were consulted in either the House or
Senate Hearings, and that tax law was rarely mentioned).
29. Under the Code, marital status determines filing status. See I.R.C. § 1 (2012). Married
couples are not permitted to file as single individuals but can file jointly or separately. Federal
income tax was largely marriage-neutral before 1948 because the tax was levied individually.
The joint tax return, allowing married couples to file jointly, was established in 1948. See
Revenue Act of 1948, §§ 301–03, Pub. L. No. 8-471, 62 Stat. 110, 114–16 (repealed 1969). For a
critique of the joint return, see generally Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Love, Money, and the IRS:
Family, Income-Sharing, and the Joint Income Tax Return, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 63 (1993).
30. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
31. As Edith Windsor said, “In the midst of my grief [after the death of my spouse], I
realized that the federal government was treating us as strangers.” Amy Davidson, The Skim
Milk in Edith Windsor’s Marriage, THE NEW YORKER (Mar. 28, 2013), http://www.newyorker
.com/online/blogs/comment/2013/03/edith-windsors-victory-doma.html.
32. Anthony C. Infanti, LGBT Families, Tax Nothings, 17 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 35, 47
(2014).
33. There is considerable literature detailing the numerous federal tax benefits and
burdens associated with marriage. See, e.g., Carter, supra note 26, at 773–74 (discussing the
marital deduction for estate and gift taxes); Edward J. McCaffery, Taxation and the Family: A
Fresh Look at Behavioral Gender Biases in the Code, 40 UCLA L. REV. 983, 988–1013 (1993)
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The marriage penalty and marriage bonus are oft-cited tax
burdens and benefits that are limited to spouses. Two high-earning
spouses filing a joint return will almost always face a greater income
tax burden as compared to two unmarried high earners filing
34
individual returns. Therefore, same-sex spouses under DOMA often
35
paid lower taxes than financially comparable opposite-sex spouses.
Other tax burdens avoided by same-sex spouses under DOMA
included the prohibition on recognition of losses on sales and
36
exchanges between related parties and taxation of debt discharged
37
to a “related person.” It is doubtful, however, that the avoidance of
these nonrate-structure burdens could be considered a meaningful
benefit for married same-sex couples forced to file federal returns as
38
single taxpayers under DOMA.
In contrast, under DOMA, certain tax benefits associated with
marriage were limited to married opposite-sex couples. For example,
the marriage bonus, received by about half of all married couples

(outlining five ways in which an individual’s tax treatment is impacted by marriage); Shari
Motro, A New “I Do”: Toward a Marriage-Neutral Income Tax, 91 IOWA L. REV. 1509, 1517–29
(2006) (discussing marriage-based income splitting and resultant lower taxes for married
couples with unequal incomes—that is, the “marriage bonus”); Zelenak, supra note 21, at 340–
41 (1994) (discussing the “marriage penalty” faced by married couples with equal incomes,
particularly those at high income levels).
34. See, e.g., Theodore Seto, The Unintended Tax Advantages of Gay Marriage, 65 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 1529, 1567–68 (2008) (illustrating the higher tax burden faced by a married
opposite-sex couple filing a joint return compared to that faced by a married same-sex couple
filing a single tax return under DOMA).
35. Id.
36. Section 267 of the Code prevents certain related parties, such as spouses and siblings,
from recognizing losses on sales to each other. I.R.C. § 267 (2012). But see Patricia Cain,
Heterosexual Privilege and the Internal Revenue Code, 34 U.S.F.L. REV. 465, 484–87 (2000)
(arguing that while same-sex spouses would presumably not be subject to this burden, certain
long-term couples run the risk of being classified as related parties by the IRS).
37. Section 108(e)(4) of the Code prohibits married couples from structuring their debt
discharges to avoid income recognition, by providing that purchase of debt by a “related
person” (including a spouse or other family member) is to be treated as a purchase by the
debtor herself. I.R.C. § 108(e)(4) (2012). Because a same-sex spouse was not recognized as a
“related person” under DOMA, a same-sex couple could structure their debt discharges to
avoid income recognition and the accompanying tax liability. For an extended discussion of this
tax-avoidance technique, see Seto, supra note 34, at 1550–51.
38. See Cain, supra note 36, at 484–91 (suggesting that any tax-avoidance benefits to samesex couples are overstated). It is important to note that while many married same-sex couples
were actually treated better than married opposite-sex couples, same-sex couples—unlike
opposite-sex couples—were unable to choose the most beneficial tax reporting stance. Id. at
469.
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filing tax returns, was inaccessible to married same-sex couples. This
marriage bonus is clearly an economic benefit, but is usually limited
40
to couples in which one spouse earns most or all of the income.
Beyond the marriage bonus, there are other marital benefits within
the Code that were unavailable to married same-sex couples under
DOMA, including the exclusion from gross income of employer41
offered fringe benefits. A key fringe benefit unavailable to same-sex
couples was employer-provided medical coverage, which is provided
42
tax-free not only to the employee but also to his or her spouse and
43
dependents. Furthermore, married same-sex couples were unable to
44
take advantage of the tax-free transfer of property between spouses,
45
46
whether in the form of a gift or as part of an estate after death.
Under DOMA, same-sex couples were also unable to receive
several nontax benefits, including Social Security benefits. The
financial implications of legalizing same-sex marriage are significant.
In 2004, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimated that by
2014, the federal government would have to pay $350 million per year
to provide Social Security benefits to married same-sex couples if it
47
recognized same-sex marriage.
39. In 1997, the Congressional Budget Office estimated that 51 percent of families received
a marriage bonus. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, FOR BETTER OR FOR WORSE:
MARRIAGE AND THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX xiv (1997). These figures have likely changed
since the report was released, but this remains the most comprehensive study of the topic.
40. Cain, supra note 36, at 469–70 (illustrating the marriage bonus received by a married
opposite-sex couple and denied to a married same-sex couple unable to file a joint tax return
under DOMA).
41. See I.R.C. § 132 (2012) (listing employer-offered fringe benefits which can be provided
tax-free to an employee). I.R.C. § 132(h) provides that certain benefits will be tax-free even if
provided to the employee’s spouse or dependent children.
42. I.R.C. § 106 (2012).
43. See Treas. Reg. § 1.106-1 (1960) (providing that the tax exclusion under Code § 106
extends to an employee’s spouse and dependents).
44. Cain, supra note 36, at 475–76 (calculating the economic burden of property transfer on
a hypothetical same-sex couple ineligible for the marital deduction); see also Anthony C.
Infanti, The Internal Revenue Code as Sodomy Statute, 44 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 763, 784–88
(2004) (describing the recordkeeping and reporting requirements faced by same-sex couples
trying to track their net interspousal transfers for income and gift tax returns).
45. See I.R.C. § 2523 (2012) (providing for the gift tax marital deduction).
46. See I.R.C. § 2056 (2012) (providing that property passing from a decedent to the
surviving spouse qualifies for a marital deduction).
47. Letter from the Congressional Budget Office to Steve Chabot, Chairman, Subcomm.
on the Constitution, Comm. on the Judiciary, U.S. House of Representatives (June 21, 2004).
This was the last time the CBO provided information on the budgetary effects of recognizing
same-sex marriage. Aside from the economic effects resulting from the denial of tax benefits,
tax scholars have also argued that differential tax treatment always carries stigmatic harm. See
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DOMA thus created “debilitating uncertainty” for married
same-sex couples, and the IRS provided little guidance to fill this
48
gap. The fact that federal tax treatment under DOMA drove several
legal challenges to DOMA shows that tax discrimination was a key
49
concern of same-sex taxpayers and advocates for marriage equality.
B. State Income Tax Treatment Under DOMA
All states that tax personal income permit married couples to file
joint tax returns and mimic the four federal filing statuses (single,
head-of-household,
married-filing-jointly,
and
married-filing50
separately), relying on the federal definition of each filing status. In
states that recognized same-sex marriage before the Supreme Court
overturned section three of DOMA, married same-sex couples were
subject to the same state income tax rules as married couples and
were permitted to file joint state tax returns. However, at the federal
level, these individuals were required to file as single taxpayers. This
nonrecognition of state marriages at the federal level produced a
“peculiar and problematic” situation with respect to state income tax
and created excessive burdens on both married same-sex couples and
51
state tax agencies.
As mentioned earlier, most state income tax laws invariably
52
piggyback on the federal income tax code. Thus, for states that
recognized the validity of a same-sex marriage (recognition states)
and also conformed to the federal tax base, DOMA completely
disrupted federal-state filing status conformity. Same-sex spouses in
recognition states were required to file as single or as head of
Cain, supra note 36, at 491–93 (discussing the stigmatic harm that results from the IRS’s
nonrecognition of same-sex marriage for tax purposes); Infanti, supra note 32, at 31–32 (arguing
that disparate tax treatment under DOMA visibly and publicly stigmatizes same-sex couples).
48. Anthony C. Infanti, LGBT Taxpayers: A Collision of “Others,” 13 GEO. J. GENDER &
L. 1, 18–20 (2012).
49. For examples of legal challenges to DOMA, see generally Gill v. Office of Pers. Mgmt.,
699 F. Supp. 2d 374 (D. Mass. 2012), aff’d sub nom. Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of Health &
Human Servs., 682 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2012); Dragovich v. U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, 872 F. Supp. 2d
944 (N.D. Cal. 2012); Golinski v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 824 F. Supp. 2d 968 (N.D. Cal. 2012),
aff’d, 724 F.3d 1048 (9th Cir. 2012); Pederson v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 881 F. Supp. 2d 294 (D.
Conn. 2012).
50. Carlton Smith & Edward Stein, Dealing with DOMA: Federal Non-Recognition
Complicates State Income Taxation of Same-Sex Relationships, 24 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 29,
40 (2012).
51. Id. at 30; see also Patricia Cain, Taxing Families Fairly, 48 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 805,
837–38 (2008).
52. Smith & Stein, supra note 50, at 30; see also infra note 81 and accompanying text.
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household for federal income tax purposes, but were treated as
53
married for state income tax purposes. Therefore, at the state level,
they were required to file using the married-filing-jointly or married54
filing-separately status. This disparity created an administrative
burden not just for state tax agencies—which could no longer rely on
federal tax return information for assessing state tax returns—but
also for same-sex taxpayers, a burden that heterosexual couples did
55
not face. Same-sex taxpayers had to spend additional time preparing
their federal and state tax returns and usually had to create a
“dummy” (pro forma) federal return using the married-filing-jointly
status to calculate their federal AGI as if they were married (the
56
usual starting point for most state income tax returns). As discussed
below in Part II, the post-Windsor IRS Ruling creates a mirror image
of this problem for same-sex couples living in nonrecognition states.
II. THE IRS RULING AND STATE TAX IMPLICATIONS
This Part introduces the post-Windsor IRS Ruling’s implications
for state income tax systems in two sections. Section A provides a
general overview of the “state-of-celebration” rule adopted by the
IRS for the purpose of determining whether a legal same-sex
marriage exists for federal tax purposes. Now that section three of
DOMA has been overturned, the marital status of same-sex couples
57
for federal tax purposes is determined by reference to state law.
Section B explores the challenges faced by states that do not
recognize same-sex marriage, but have income tax regimes that
generally conform to the federal income tax system. It provides an
overview of the costs and benefits associated with state income tax
conformity with the federal income tax, and highlights the difficulties
states would face if they decoupled from the federal tax base.

53. Anthony C. Infanti, The Moonscape of Tax Equality: Windsor and Beyond, 108 NW. U.
L. REV. COLLOQUY 110, 125 (2013). For a list of recognition states, see infra Table 1.
54. Id.
55. Smith & Stein, supra note 50, at 44.
56. In addition to the extra time and expense of tax preparation for same-sex couples, there
was also the likelihood that their returns would contain more mistakes and that they might face
a greater audit risk. See id. at 44 (discussing the problems faced by same-sex couples and
suggesting ways to ease their administrative burden).
57. Rev. Rul. 2013-17, 2013-38 I.R.B. 202.
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A. An Overview of the IRS Ruling
The Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Windsor led to a
dramatic shift in the federal government’s legal treatment of same-sex
marriage, particularly from a tax perspective. Under DOMA, the
federal government defined marriage as being between one man and
58
one woman. Following Windsor, however, spousal status is
determined by the state of celebration for purposes of federal rights
59
and entitlements. The majority opinion made it clear that states
60
were not required to recognize same-sex marriage. However,
Windsor left unclear how the federal government was to determine
whether a same-sex couple was legally married for purposes of the
myriad federal rules and regulations that require a definition of
marriage, including the Code. As Justice Antonin Scalia wrote in his
dissent, at the time it was not clear whether, in determining marital
status for federal tax purposes, the IRS would use the state of current
domicile, the state of celebration, or the state of domicile at the time
61
the marriage was entered into. Thus, in the absence of a uniform
federal definition of marriage post-Windsor, the federal government
62
is confronted with choice-of-law issues.
In settling this question, the IRS issued Revenue Ruling 2013-17
(IRS Ruling), holding that for federal tax purposes the IRS
“recognizes the validity of a same-sex marriage that was valid in the
58. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
59. For example, same-sex spouses will now be able to receive the entirety of a
participant’s Section 401(k) account balance at death, unless the spouse consented to another
beneficiary. See 29 U.S.C. § 1055 (2012) (requiring pension plans to give survivorship rights to
spouses of plan participants).
60. The majority opinion begins by noting that it is not addressing section 2 of DOMA,
which allows states to refuse to recognize same-sex marriages legally performed elsewhere.
United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct, 2675, 2683 (2013). However, in the wake of Windsor, one
federal district court has held that interstate recognition of same-sex marriage is constitutionally
required. See Obergfell v. Kasich, No. 1:13–cv–501, 2013 WL 3814262, at *8 (S.D. Ohio. July 22,
2013). In a recent article, Professor William Baude addresses the impact of Windsor on
interstate recognition of same-sex marriage, noting that the “validity of Section 2 is a natural
question after Windsor.” William Baude, Interstate Recognition of Same-Sex Marriage After
Windsor, 8 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 150, 151 (2013).
61. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2708 (Scalia, J. dissenting). “State of celebration” refers to the
state where the couple was married. “State of domicile” can be interpreted as either the current
place of residence or the residence at the time of the wedding.
62. In an excellent article, Professor William Baude tackled this choice-of-law dilemma and
the question of how the federal government should decide which state’s law applies in order to
determine when a same-sex marriage is valid. Baude presciently recognized that judges would
confront this choice-of-law problem following the demise of DOMA. William Baude, Beyond
DOMA: Choice of State Law in Federal Statutes, 64 STAN. L. REV. 1371, 1381 (2012).
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state where it was entered into, regardless of the married couple’s
63
place of domicile.” This state-of-celebration rule is the same
standard that the IRS has applied to common-law marriages since it
64
issued Revenue Ruling 58-66 in 1958. Indeed, the IRS Ruling
explicitly recognized this precedent, stating that “[f]or over half a
century, for federal income tax purposes, the Service has recognized
marriages based on the laws of the state in which they were entered
65
into, without regard to subsequent changes in domicile . . . .” The
IRS thus extended Revenue Ruling 58-66 to apply to same-sex
marriages as well.
In arguing for its position, the IRS reasoned that the state-ofcelebration rule had been successfully applied to common-law
66
marriages for over fifty years. Furthermore, “[g]iven our increasingly
mobile society,” it was important to have a “uniform rule of
recognition that can be applied with certainty . . . for all federal tax
67
purposes.” Importantly, the IRS Ruling also outlined the
administrative problems and adverse consequences associated with
adopting a state-of-domicile rule (instead of a state-of-celebration
rule) for taxpayers, employers, and employee benefit plan
68
administrators. The IRS wanted to avoid the problems that would
arise with a state-of-domicile rule, with “marriages possibly appearing
69
and disappearing each time a taxpayer moves.”
The IRS Ruling raises several new concerns. As Professor
Anthony C. Infanti points out, the IRS Ruling does not address the
70
status of evasive marriages or choice-of-law issues that arise in
63. Rev. Rul. 2013-17, 2013-38 I.R.B. 202.
64. Rev. Rul. 58-66, 1958-1 C.B. 60 (providing that the IRS would treat individuals as
married if applicable state law treated them as married under common-law marriage rules, and
would also recognize marriages even “in the case of taxpayers who enter into a common-law
marriage in a state which recognizes such relationship and who later move into a state in which
a ceremony is required to initiate the marital relationship”).
65. Rev. Rul. 2013-17, 2013-38 I.R.B. 201.8.
66. Id. at 3.
67. Id. at 10. But see Infanti, supra note 53, at 118 (arguing that the IRS Ruling provides
“no more than the same veneer of clarity that DOMA did, as it leaves important questions
unanswered, lays traps for the unwary, creates inequities, and entails unfortunate (and
hopefully, unintended) consequences”).
68. For example, the IRS noted that under a state-of-domicile rule, employee benefit plan
administrators “would need to continually track the state of domicile of all married same-sex
employees and former employees and their spouses.” Rev. Rul. 2013-17, 2013-38 I.R.B. 204.
69. Infanti, supra note 53, at 118.
70. Evasive marriages occur when a couple domiciled in one state travels to another state
to marry and immediately returns to their state of domicile to live. Id. at 119 (discussing the
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determinations of parent-child relationships; these issues are often
linked to the marital status of parents and affect federal tax
71
treatment. Importantly, the IRS Ruling does not apply for state tax
purposes unless a state expressly adopts it. Therefore, state income
tax filings for married same-sex couples living in nonrecognition
states present an open question for taxpayers and state tax authorities
alike.
B. Implications for State Income Tax: Disrupting Conformity
Before discussing the ways in which nonrecognition states are
responding to the IRS Ruling, it is important to examine what is the
cornerstone of many state income tax systems: conformity with the
federal tax base. State income tax conformity with the federal income
72
tax system is more of a rule than an exception. The IRS Ruling has
the potential to disrupt conformity; one might argue that it already
has. Although the IRS Ruling creates consistency for federal tax
purposes, it complicates income tax filing at the state level, just as
section three of DOMA complicated tax filing for married same-sex
73
couples residing in states that legally recognized their marriages.
State conformity with the federal tax base can assume a variety
74
of forms, and the degree of conformity can vary greatly in strength.
Some states use a “rolling” conformity, with changes in federal tax
75
provisions automatically applying to the state tax code as they occur.
Other states use a fixed or “static” conformity, conforming to the

unclear federal tax status of same-sex couples in evasive marriages). However, a natural reading
of the IRS Ruling seems to include both migratory and evasive marriages, a point that makes
this topic even more significant, given that many same-sex couples in evasive marriages are
impacted by newly adopted state income tax provisions.
71. See Infanti, supra note 53, at 120–21 (explaining that the IRS Ruling does not address
instances in which marital status is relevant to the determination of federal tax consequences
only indirectly through the application of state law, as with the existence of parent-child
relationships).
72. See infra note 91 and accompanying text.
73. See supra Part I.B.
74. Heather M. Fields, Binding Choices: Tax Elections & Federal/State Conformity, 32 VA.
TAX REV. 527, 537 (2013).
75. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 79-32,109a (2014); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 47:290 (2014);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 77-2714 (2014).
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76

federal tax code as it existed on a certain date, and still others use a
77
“selective” conformity—adopting only certain federal tax provisions.
Federal-state tax conformity is most visible in the computation of
state income tax, as most state income tax regimes at some point
78
reference the federal tax code. Most states, like the federal
79
government, impose an income tax on taxable income only. On the
federal level, taxable income is then adjusted to produce AGI, which
80
is then reduced by any deductions and exemptions. Almost all states
do not require a separate calculation of taxable income. Instead, most
state-level calculations begin with federal AGI, which is then adjusted
81
to eliminate or add certain items. States then apply their own
82
deductions and exemptions to the state taxable income.
States generally conform to the federal tax code to minimize
83
taxpayers’ calculations, record-keeping, and compliance burdens.
However, to reflect the values and preferences of the taxpayers in a
particular state, state legislators may want to tax married same-sex
84
couples differently than does the federal government. Thus, in states
that do not recognize same-sex marriage, but do conform to the
federal tax base, the post-Windsor IRS Ruling may create a mirror
image of the pre-Windsor challenge faced by same-sex couples, in
85
terms of complexity and administrative burden.

76. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 43-105 (2014) (West); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 141.010 (West 2014); VA. CODE. ANN. § 58.1-301 (West 2014).
77. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 40-18-1.1 (2014) (using a “rolling” conformity, but only for
select provisions).
78. See infra Table 2.
79. Smith & Stein, supra note 50, at 34.
80. Id.
81. While the majority of states that impose a personal income tax use federal AGI as the
starting point, certain other states use federal taxable income or federal gross income as the
starting point for determining state taxable income. See State Personal Income Taxes: Federal
Starting Points, FED’N OF TAX ADM’RS (Jan. 1, 2014), http://www.taxadmin.org/fta/rate/
stg_pts.pdf (providing an overview of the conformity starting point for each state).
82. See Computing State Taxable Income, 1 BENDER’S STATE TAXATION: PRINCIPLES AND
PRACTICE § 8.03 (Charles W. Swenson ed., 2014) (describing how states allow deductions and
various exemptions to the taxpayer).
83. See generally Mason, supra note 12, at 1279–81 (describing various advantages arising
from states having the same tax base as the federal government).
84. In states with their own constitutional provisions barring same-sex marriages (“miniDOMAs”), such as Arizona, Idaho, and Virginia, state legislators would face constitutional
hurdles if they chose to recognize married same-sex couples for the purpose of state income tax
filings.
85. See supra notes 52–55 and accompanying text.
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Forty-one states impose a broad-based income tax, seven states
have no individual income tax, and two states only tax interest and
86
dividend income. This Note focuses on states that impose a broadbased income tax, and within that group of states, gives specific
attention to states that do not recognize same-sex marriage and that
87
do conform at some level to the federal income tax system. Table 1
provides a list of recognition and nonrecognition states.
88

Table 1: State Recognition of Same-Sex Marriage

States with Statutes or Judicial
Decisions Allowing Same-Sex
Marriage

California, Connecticut, Delaware,
Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Maine,
Maryland, Massachusetts,
Minnesota, New Hampshire, New
Jersey, New Mexico, New York,
Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode
Island, Vermont, Washington,
District of Columbia

States with Constitutional
Provisions Banning Same-Sex
Marriage but with Broad
Recognition Short of Marriage

Colorado, Nevada

States with Constitutional or
Statutory Bans on Same-Sex
Marriage

Alabama, Alaska, Arizona,
Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Idaho,
Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Michigan, Missouri,
Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska,
North Carolina, North Dakota,
Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina,
South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas,
Utah, Virginia, West Virginia,
Wisconsin, Wyoming

86. Mason, supra note 12, at 1274–75.
87. Twenty-one states fit this description. See infra Table 2 and note 93.
88. This table is based on information compiled by the National Conference of State
Legislatures. See Defining Marriage: Defense of Marriage Acts and Same-Sex Marriage Laws,
NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Sept. 5, 2014), http://www.ncsl.org/
research/human-services/same-sex-marriage-overview.aspx (providing an overview of same-sexmarriage laws by state).
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Thus, at the time of this publication, nineteen states and the
89
District of Columbia allowed same-sex marriage. In contrast, thirtyone states currently ban same-sex marriage by statute or
90
constitutional provision.
Table 2 illustrates the varying degrees of conformity between
state income tax regimes and their federal counterpart.
91

Table 2: State Conformity with the Federal Tax Code

Starts with Federal AGI, then
Applies One Rate

Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Utah

Starts with Federal Taxable
Income, then Applies One Rate

Colorado

Starts with Federal Taxable
Income, then Applies Own Rates
to Federal Brackets

North Dakota, Vermont

89. See id.
90. Id. As of September 5, 2014, twenty-eight states have constitutional mini-DOMAs
banning same-sex marriage, while three states have statutory provisions doing the same. In
thirteen of these states (namely, Arkansas, Colorado, Florida, Idaho, Indiana, Kentucky,
Michigan, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, and Wisconsin), judges have issued
rulings allowing same-sex marriage, but many of these rulings have been stayed as they proceed
to appellate courts.
91. This table is based on information compiled by the Tax Foundation. See Joseph
Henchman, IRS Issues “State of Celebration” Guidance for Same-Sex Couples, TAX
FOUNDATION 3–4 (Aug. 29, 2013), http://taxfoundation.org/article/irs-issues-state-celebrationguidance-same-sex-couples-further-guidance-24-states-may-be-required (describing the various
degrees of state conformity with the federal tax code). The table only includes states that have
some form of individual income tax and that require reference to the federal return.
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Starts with Federal Taxable
Income, then Applies Own Rates
and Brackets

Minnesota, North Carolina,92 South
Carolina

Starts with Federal AGI, then
Applies Own Rates and Brackets

Arizona, California, Connecticut,
Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho,
Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Maine, Maryland, Missouri, Montana,
Nebraska, New Mexico, New York,
Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode
Island, Virginia, West Virginia,
Wisconsin

Starts with Federal Gross Income,
then Applies Own Rates and
Brackets

Massachusetts, District of Columbia

Consequently, twenty-one states do not recognize same-sex
marriage but do require state taxpayers to reference their federal tax
93
return when preparing their state tax returns. These states are
directly impacted by the IRS Ruling. In formulating their responses
to it, they must decide whether to continue to conform to the federal
income tax system.
Tax commentators have long warned states that, given the
benefits associated with federal-state tax-base conformity, decoupling
from the federal tax base is not a viable option. This issue has
received renewed attention following the IRS Ruling. A few days
after the IRS Ruling was issued, Joseph Henchman of the Tax
Foundation cautioned affected states to resist calls to delink or
decouple from the federal tax base, arguing that “decoupling is a

92. Through December 2013, North Carolina taxpayers started with federal taxable income
and applied state rates and brackets. As of January 2014 (and for their 2014 tax returns),
taxpayers start with federal AGI and then apply one tax rate. Id. at 4.
93. These states are: Arizona, Colorado, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Michigan, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio,
Oklahoma, South Carolina, Utah, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wisconsin.
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94

move away from sound tax policy.” At the same time, other tax
experts have noted that some states would be tempted to decouple
regardless of the costs, but are kept from doing so by state statutes
95
that mandate conformity. Insofar as certain nonrecognition states
must now determine whether to continue to conform to the federal
tax base, this Part discusses the costs and benefits associated with
conformity.
1. Benefits of Conformity. Conformity to the federal tax base
provides sizeable benefits, such as simplifying tax preparation,
reducing taxpayers’ compliance costs, and aiding state tax
96
enforcement goals. Indeed, Professor Ruth Mason argues that the
administrative advantages of tax-base conformity are so substantial
97
that states will not abandon conformity in general.
From the taxpayer’s perspective, conformity to the federal tax
system reduces recordkeeping and filing burdens and thus makes
98
compliance easier. For instance, to complete their state income tax
returns for the same year, taxpayers do not need to engage in
99
separate calculations of their income; they only need to make minor
100
adjustments to federally computed items. In many cases, taxpayers

94. Richard Borean, Options for States Accommodating IRS’s Same-Sex Ruling, TAX
FOUNDATION (Aug. 29, 2013), http://taxfoundation.org/article/options-states-accommodatingirs-s-same-sex-ruling (quoting Joseph Henchman).
95. See Maria Koklanaris, States Respond to IRS Same-Sex Guidance, STATE TAX NOTES,
Sept. 16, 2013, available at LEXIS, 69 STATE TAX NOTES 694, 694 (“But [states’] problem is that
the statute says a taxpayer should start with the federal return when filing state income taxes.”).
96. There is considerable literature discussing the compliance and administrability benefits
associated with conformity. See generally, e.g., Fields, supra note 74, at 537–40; Mason, supra
note 12, at 1297; Richard D. Pomp, Restructuring a State Income Tax in Response to the Tax
Reform Act of 1986, TAX NOTES TODAY, Sept. 14, 1987, available at LEXIS, 36 TAX NOTES
1195, 1199; Daniel Shaviro, An Economic and Political Look at Federalism in Taxation, 90
MICH. L. REV. 895, 920–21 (1992); Otto G. Stolz & George A. Purdy, Federal Collection of State
Individual Income Taxes, 1977 DUKE L.J. 59, 126–27 (1977).
97. Mason, supra note 12, at 1273. But see Fields, supra note 74, at 538 n.31 (“As the degree
of conformity weakens . . . the compliance, simplicity, and administrability benefits . . . generally
decrease.”).
98. See Mason, supra note 12, at 1280 (“[C]onformity avoids the need for taxpayers to
calculate their income twice or to keep two sets of records.”).
99. Id.
100. Smith & Stein, supra note 50, at 32.
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file federal and state tax forms together using electronic filing
101
programs.
From the perspective of state tax authorities, conformity leads to
efficiencies in enforcement and administration of the income tax
system. State tax agencies receive federal tax return information from
102
the IRS, which states can use to assess additional state tax.
Furthermore, many states audit individual state income tax reports
103
primarily through federal tax data and audit reports. States can thus
104
benefit from (or, as Professor Mason describes it, “free ride” on)
105
the IRS’s “superior capacity for enforcement.” States can also avail
themselves of well-developed federal tax definitions, interpretive
106
guidance, and case law. From an economic-efficiency perspective,
states need not reinvent the wheel—they can instead rely on the IRS
and Treasury’s expertise when it comes to tasks such as drafting tax
107
regulations.
From a multistate perspective, federal-state tax-base conformity
reduces the risk of taxpayers exploiting disparities in state tax regimes

101. Harley Duncan & LeAnne Luna, Lending a Helping Hand: Two Governments Can
Work Together, 60 NAT’L TAX J. 663, 672 (2007) (“The most ambitious effort has been in the
area of cooperative or coordinated electronic filing.”).
102. Id. at 669. Information exchanged includes copies of federal audits, address and
location information for taxpayers, and information on possible taxpayer assets. Id. I.R.C.
§ 6103(d)(1) provides that returns and return information should:
[B]e open to inspection by, or disclosure to, any State agency, body, or commission,
or its legal representative, which is charged under the laws of such State with
responsibility for the administration of [s]tate tax laws for the purpose of, and only to
the extent necessary in, the administration of such laws.
I.R.C. § 6103(d)(1) (2012) (emphasis added).
103. Duncan & Luna, supra note 101, at 669; see also Smith & Stein, supra note 50, at 33
(noting that because state income tax rates are so low, it would be too costly for the states to
audit certain items, but the IRS can undertake federal audits for these items because high
federal tax rates justify the expense).
104. Mason, supra note 12, at 1280.
105. David A. Super, Rethinking Fiscal Federalism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2544, 2595 (2005);
see also Stolz & Purdy, supra note 96, at 70–75 (describing federal-state cooperation in
enforcement of tax laws).
106. Fields, supra note 74, at 539; see also Kirk J. Stark, The Federal Role in State Tax
Reform, 30 VA. TAX REV. 407, 423–24 (2010) (“The very existence of the Code, Treasury
Regulations, IRS administrative guidance, and federal judicial case law creates an almost
irresistible incentive for the states to . . . piggyback on the federal income tax.”).
107. Mason, supra note 12, at 1281; see also Michael C. Dorf, Dynamic Incorporation of
Foreign Law, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 103, 135 (2008) (detailing costs associated with writing
regulations and arguing that “by piggybacking on the federal definition [of income], the state
legislature saves itself and its taxing authority the work of adjusting the law to changing
circumstances.”).
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108

for tax-avoidance purposes. Thus, both taxpayers and states stand to
gain from federal-state tax-base conformity in terms of filing,
compliance, administration, and enforcement costs.
2. Costs of Conformity. As previously explained, states derive
numerous benefits from conformity with the federal tax base. But at
109
the same time, “[t]hese benefits come at a cost.” States that conform
to the federal tax base cede authority to the federal government over
110
111
112
questions such as tax incentives, tax penalties, filing statuses, and
113
the definition of income.
With federal-state tax conformity,
Congress—not the state legislatures—makes the key determinations
about such matters. By adopting federal tax policy preferences, states
cannot tailor their tax policies to local conditions and local voter
114
preferences. In this way, tax treatment of married same-sex couples
typifies the tension between federal and local policy preferences.
Federal-state tax-base conformity also impedes states’ ability to
tailor tax incentives or penalties to local conditions. As Professor
Mason points out, “one-size-fits-all” federal tax incentives can create
115
divergent effects in different states and can also cause inefficiencies.
State legislators may also suffer political stigma from their default
116
adoption of federal tax policies. Furthermore, although states
reduce their administrative and enforcement burdens by adopting
Treasury and IRS tax regulations and guidance, they also cede their
108. Shaviro, supra note 96, at 911 (“Tax base disparities present obvious planning
opportunities for taxpayers . . . .”).
109. Fields, supra note 74, at 537.
110. See Mason, supra note 12, at 1293 (describing states’ importation of federal tax
incentives, including incentives for home ownership, employer provision of health insurance,
charity, savings, and family planning).
111. See id. (describing the importation of federal tax provisions that penalize activities such
as “gambling, failure to save, failure to buy private health insurance, and participation in the
illegal drug trade” (footnotes omitted)).
112. The federal income tax regime recognizes four filing statuses: single, head-ofhousehold, married-filing-separately, and married-filing-jointly. Conformity binds states to
these filing statuses, which impact tax liability considerably. The latter two in particular have
been the subject of much scholarly writing. See supra note 33.
113. See Mason, supra note 12, at 1275 (describing how most states incorporate federal
definitions of income into their own tax laws).
114. See Ruth Mason, Federalism and the Taxing Power, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 975, 1020 (2011)
(“[W]hen states adopt the federal tax base as their own tax base, they deliberately or
inadvertently import into their own tax systems federal regulatory preferences . . . .”).
115. Mason, supra note 12, at 1303.
116. See Fields, supra note 74, at 542 (arguing that state conformity with federal tax law can
undermine state legislators’ political accountability).
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administrative and enforcement authority to the Treasury. Thus,
federal-state tax conformity entails significant costs as well as obvious
benefits.
III. FORMULATING RULES: STATE RESPONSES TO THE IRS RULING
A. Two Approaches to Computing State Income Tax Post-Windsor
This Part discusses the various approaches that the twenty-one
affected states have adopted in response to the IRS Ruling. These
approaches can be roughly classified into two models: the Louisiana
Model and the Missouri Model.
1. The Louisiana Model. Louisiana requires same-sex couples
who are eligible for joint federal filing to file separate individual
117
returns at the state level. The Louisiana Department of Revenue
cited the state’s constitutional ban on same-sex marriage in support of
its ruling, stating that “any recognition of a same-sex filing status in
Louisiana as promulgated in IRS Revenue Ruling 2013-17 would be a
118
clear violation of Louisiana’s Constitution.”
Same-sex spouses in Louisiana with a federal filing status of
married filing jointly or married filing separately must file a separate
state tax return using the status of single or, if qualified, head of
household. Because Louisiana uses federal AGI as the starting point
for state income tax calculations, taxpayers must create “dummy”
federal tax returns—using a filing status of either single or head of
119
household—to calculate their individual federal AGI. They then use
their recalculated federal AGI to file the single state income tax
return.
Several other states have also disallowed married same-sex
couples from using a joint tax return for state tax returns. These states

117. La. Dep’t of Revenue, Revenue Information Bulletin No. 13-024 (Sept. 13, 2013),
available at http://revenue.louisiana.gov/forms/lawspolicies/RIB%2013-024.pdf.
118. Id. The relevant constitutional provision reads:
Marriage in the state of Louisiana shall consist only of the union of one man and one
woman. No official or court of the state of Louisiana shall construe this constitution
or any state law to require that marriage or the legal incidents thereof be conferred
upon any member of a union other than the union of one man and one woman.
LA. CONST., art. XII, § 15.
119. The Revenue Information Bulletin instructs taxpayers with a federal filing status of
married filing jointly or married filing separately to provide the same federal income tax
information on the state income tax return that they would have provided before the IRS
Ruling was issued. La. Dep’t of Revenue, supra note 117.
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121

122

75
123

124

Idaho,
Indiana,
Kentucky,
Michigan,
include Georgia,
125
126
127
128
Montana,
Nebraska,
North Carolina,
Oklahoma,
South
129
130
131
Carolina, Virginia, and West Virginia.

120. Ga. Dep’t of Revenue, Informational Bulletin IT-2013-10-25, U.S. Supreme Court and
the Defense of Marriage Act, at 4 (Oct. 25, 2013), available at https://etax.dor.ga.gov/
TaxLawandPolicy/DOMA_bulletin_10-25-2013.pdf. Georgia law does not require taxpayers to
use the same filing status for state and federal purposes, but federal AGI is used as a starting
point for calculating Georgia taxable income. Id. For Georgia income tax purposes, individuals
in a same-sex marriage must recompute federal AGI as if they had filed a single federal income
tax return to complete their individual state income tax returns. Id.
121. Idaho State Tax Comm’n, Instructions for 2013 Individual Income Tax, at 5 (2013)
available at http://tax.idaho.gov/forms/EIN00046_11-22-2013.pdf. These instructions state that
although Idaho filing status must mirror the federal filing status, this requirement does not
apply to same-sex couples filing a joint federal return. Id. Each taxpayer must prepare a
recomputed federal income tax return using the filing status of single or head of household and
use it to file an Idaho tax return as single or head of household. Id. The Idaho State Legislature
passed emergency legislation codifying this State Tax Commission guidance in February 2014.
Idaho H.B. 375 revised the state’s income tax provisions as follows: “For all purposes of the
Idaho income tax act, a marriage must be one that is considered valid or recognized under
section 28, article III, of the constitution of the state of Idaho and defined in section 32-201,
Idaho Code, or as recognized under section 32-209, Idaho Code.” Idaho Code Ann. § 63-3004(c)
(West 2014).
122. Ind. Dep’t of Revenue, Same-Sex Marriage Tax Filing Guidance, IN.GOV (Nov. 22,
2013), http://www.in.gov/dor/4895.htm.
123. Ky. Dep’t of Revenue, Same-Sex Married Couples Filing Guidance, KY. TAX ALERT,
Nov. 2013, at 1, 1.
124. Mich. Dep’t of Treasury, Notice to Taxpayers: Same-Sex Couples Filing Joint Federal
Income Tax Returns Must File Michigan Income Tax Returns as Single Filers (Sept. 27, 2013),
http://www.michigan.gov/documents/taxes/DOMAnotice_434103_7.pdf.
125. Memorandum from the Mont. Dep’t of Revenue to the Revenue and Transportation
Interim Comm. (Oct. 1, 2013), available at http://revenue.mt.gov/Portals/9/committees/
Revenue_Transportation/2013-2014/october/Discussion_of_Same_Sex_Marriage.pdf.
The
memorandum cites the state’s constitutional ban on same-sex marriage as grounds for its
decision. Id.
126. Neb. Dep’t of Revenue, Rev. Rul. 22-13-11 (Oct. 24, 2013). The Revenue Ruling is
based on Nebraska’s constitutional ban on recognizing same-sex marriage and requires a
married same-sex individual to file a Nebraska income tax return as “single.” Id. Nebraska’s
Department of Revenue declined to enforce a state statute, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 77-2732 (2013),
mandating conformity between federal and state income tax filing statuses.
127. N.C. Dep’t of Revenue, Directive PD-13-1 (Oct. 18, 2013), available at
http://www.dornc.com/practitioner/individual/directives/pd-13-1.pdf. Legally married same-sex
couples in North Carolina must file a dummy federal return for state purposes to recompute
their AGI, deductions, and tax credits; this form is submitted along with the state tax return. Id.
The directive cites the state’s statutory ban on same-sex marriage as the basis for its decision. Id.
In Bostic v. Schaefer, No. 14-1167, 2014 WL 3702493 (4th Cir. July 28, 2014), the Fourth Circuit
struck down a state ban on same-sex marriage. Unless the Supreme Court overturns that
decision, the North Carolina Department of Revenue position will presumably need to be
revisited. The Fourth Circuit decision will also affect the tax guidance issued by state tax
authorities in South Carolina, Virginia, and West Virginia.
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A few states have slightly modified this model and created
worksheets for married same-sex taxpayers to use to recalculate their
taxable income on an individual basis. States adopting this worksheet
132
133
134
135
approach include Arizona, Kansas, North Dakota, Ohio, and

128. Public Notice, Okla. Tax Comm’n, NOTICE: Oklahoma Income Tax Filing Status for
Same Sex Couples (Sept. 27, 2013), available at http://www.tax.ok.gov/upmin092713.html. Samesex couples in Oklahoma “must provide the same federal income tax information on [their]
state return that would have been provided prior to the issuance of the IRS Ruling.” Id. They
must prepare a dummy return recomputing their federal income tax as single or head of
household and, if required, submit this dummy return with their state income tax return. Id. The
Oklahoma Tax Commission position will presumably need to be revisited unless the Tenth
Circuit’s decision in Bishop v. Smith, Nos. 14-5003, 14-5006, 2014 WL3537847 (10th Cir. July 18,
2014), striking down a ban on same-sex marriage, is overturned by the Supreme Court.
129. S.C. Dep’t of Revenue, SC Individual Income Tax, at 3-3 (2013), available at
http://www.sctax.org/Tax+Policy/SC+Individual+Income+Tax+Manual.htm.
130. Va. Dep’t of Taxation, Tax Bulletin 13-13 (Nov. 8, 2013), available at
http://www.tax.virginia.gov/Documents/TB_13-13_DOMA.pdf. Notably, the Bulletin recognizes
that Virginia’s income tax law generally conforms to federal income tax law and that a couple’s
marital status for state income tax purposes is based on their marital status for federal income
tax purposes. Id. It then requires Virginia to decouple from the federal income tax treatment of
same-sex marriage because of the state’s constitutional and statutory bans on same-sex
marriage. Id.
131. See generally W. Va. State Tax Dep’t, Personal Income Tax Forms & Instructions, at 16
(2014), available at http://www.state.wv.us/taxrev/forms/2013/it140.forms-and-instructions.pdf
(referring to husband and wife when discussing married filings). West Virginia has enacted
legislation mandating conformity to the federal income tax base. Any term used in the state’s
income tax law has the same meaning as when it is used in a comparable context in federal
income tax law. W. VA CODE § 11-21-1 (2013). However, the State Tax Department requires
married same-sex couples to file state income taxes as single individuals. W. Va. State Tax
Dep’t, supra.
132. Press Release, Ariz. Dep’t of Revenue, A New 2012 Individual Income Tax Form is
Now Available For Same-Sex Couples That File A Joint Federal Tax Return To Determine
Their Starting Point For Their Arizona Single Returns (Oct. 11, 2013), available at
http://www.azdor.gov/News/tabid/74/newsid530/476/A-New-2012-Individual-Income-Tax-Formis-now-Available-For-Same-Sex-Couples-That-File-A-Joint-Federal-Tax-Return-ToDetermine-Their-Starting-Point-For-Their-Arizona-Single-Returns-/Default.aspx.
133. Kan. Dep’t of Revenue, Notice 13-18, at 1 (Oct. 4, 2013), available at
http://www.ksrevenue.org/taxnotices/notice13-18.pdf. Kansas requires same-sex individuals who
are married for federal income tax purposes to file a separate Kansas income tax return using
the filing status of single or head of household. Id. They must also complete a worksheet
allocating the federal AGI reported on the joint federal income tax return and determining their
individual federal AGI for Kansas tax-filing purposes. Id.
134. N.D. Dep’t of Revenue, Guideline: Income Tax Filing by Individuals in a Same-Sex
Marriage
(2012),
available
at
http://www.nd.gov/tax/indincome/pubs/guide/samesexmarriageguideline.pdf?20131223172303. North Dakota requires each individual in a samesex marriage to file a separate state income tax return and to complete a supplemental
worksheet allocating income. Id. The guidelines specifically cite the state’s constitutional ban on
same-sex marriage. Id.
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136

There is no substantive difference between the
Wisconsin.
“dummy” federal return approach and the worksheet approach, as
both are methods of allocating income between spouses.
2. The Missouri Model. Missouri requires married same-sex
couples who file a joint federal income tax return to file a combined
state income tax return as well. On November 14, 2013, Missouri
Governor Jeremiah Nixon issued an Executive Order stating that
because the state tax code is coupled to the federal tax code, the state
Department of Revenue “must apply the same meaning to the phrase
‘husband and wife’ as is applied under federal law pursuant to [IRS]
137
Revenue Ruling 2013-17.”
Missouri’s approach was unprecedented, making it the first
nonrecognition state to recognize same-sex marriages for state tax
purposes. This decision is particularly notable because Missouri has
constitutionally prohibited recognition of same-sex marriages since
138
2004. Thus, although the Executive Order complies with Missouri’s
conformity statute, it is at odds with the state’s constitution.
Missouri might have been the first state to adopt this approach,
but a handful of nonrecognition states soon followed. On November
29, 2013, the Colorado Department of Revenue promulgated an
emergency regulation clarifying the income tax filing status for same139
sex couples. The regulation mandates that, because Colorado’s state
135. Ohio Dep’t of Taxation, IT 2013-01 – Filing Guidelines for Taxpayers Filing a Joint
Federal Income Tax Return with Someone of the Same Gender (Dec. 19, 2013), available at
http://www.tax.ohio.gov/Portals/0/ohio_individual/individual/information_releases/
DOMAInformationRelease.pdf. Ohio requires each spouse in a same-sex marriage to file a
separate Ohio income tax return using the filing status of single or head of household and for
the two spouses to complete a supplementary Ohio Schedule IT S to be attached to their
individual returns. Id. This schedule enables each spouse to allocate the federal AGI reported
on her joint federal income tax return and determine her individual federal AGI for Ohio taxfiling purposes. Id.
136. Wis. Dep’t of Revenue, Tax Guidance for Individuals in a Same-Sex Marriage (Sept. 6,
2013), http://www.revenue.wi.gov/taxpro/news/130906.html. Each member of a same-sex
marriage must file a separate Wisconsin income tax return as single or head of household. Id.
Each spouse must also complete Schedule S, which enables her to allocate her federal AGI
reported on the federal joint income tax return and calculate the federal AGI to be used for
Wisconsin tax purposes. Id.
137. Mo. Exec. Order No. 13-14 (Nov. 14, 2013), available at http://governor.mo.gov/orders/
2013/13-14.htm.
138. MO. CONST. art. I, § 33.
139. COLO. CODE REGS. § 201-2 (2014); see also Colo. Dep’t of Revenue, Income Tax Filing
Status for Same-Sex Couples (Nov. 29, 2013), available at http://www.colorado.gov/cs/
Satellite/Revenue/REVX/1251648321168.
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tax code is coupled with the federal tax code and uses federal taxable
income as the starting point for state income tax determinations, all
Colorado taxpayers must use the same filing status for federal and
state income tax returns.
140
Until May 19, 2014, Oregon did not allow same-sex marriages.
As a nonrecognition state, however, it treated same-sex couples
legally married in other jurisdictions as married for Oregon tax
141
purposes.
Thus, married same-sex couples in Oregon could
complete their 2013 state income tax return using the same filing
142
status and information provided on their federal returns. Utah has
gone back-and-forth on the issue of recognizing same-sex marriage
143
for state income tax purposes. Given Utah’s uncertain status as a
nonrecognition state, the Utah Tax Commission ultimately
determined that couples married before the end of 2013 would be
eligible to file joint state tax returns if they elected to file joint federal
144
income tax returns. Notably, the newest tax guidance goes beyond

140. On May 19, 2014, a federal district court judge declared that same-sex couples in
Oregon had the right to marry. No party appealed and the decision took effect in Oregon.
Geiger v. Kitzhaber, No. 6:13-cv-01834-MC, 2014 WL 2054264, at *16 (D. Or. May 19, 2014).
141. Or. Dep’t of Revenue, Oregon Tax Information for Same-Sex Married Couples (2013),
available at http://www.oregon.gov/dor/PERTAX/Pages/same-sex.aspx.
142. Id.
143. Initially, the Utah Tax Commission Chairman indicated that married same-sex couples
could file state income taxes as married, based on conformity with federal law. Ray Parker &
Dan Harrie, IRS to Treat Same-Sex Marriages Equally for Tax Purposes, SALT LAKE TRIB.,
Aug. 29, 2013, available at http://www.sltrib.com/sltrib/world/56799616-68/sex-married-taxcouples.html.csp. However, the Utah State Tax Commission then instructed same-sex couples
filing a joint federal return to file their Utah income tax returns using the same information that
they would have provided prior to the IRS Ruling. Utah State Income Tax Comm’n, Utah
Income Tax Filing Status for Same-Sex Couples (Oct. 9, 2013), http://tax.utah.gov/notice/201310-09.pdf. Same-sex spouses are now told to complete an “as-if” federal return with a single or
head-of-household filing status and complete their Utah return using this pro forma federal
return. Id. These instructions were called into question by a federal court’s ruling overturning
Utah’s constitutional ban on same-sex marriage. Kitchen v. Herbert No. 2:13-cv-217, 2013 WL
6697874, at *1215–16 (D. Utah Dec. 20, 2013), aff’d No. 13-4178, 2014 WL 2868044 (10th Cir.
June 25, 2014). In January 2014, the U.S. Supreme Court granted Utah’s application for a stay
pending appeal. Herbert v. Kitchen, 134 S. Ct. 893, 839 (2014). The Utah governor’s office
refused to recognize the one-thousand-plus same-sex marriages that took place before the stay
was granted. Jack Healy, Utah Says It Won’t Recognize Same-Sex Marriages It Licensed, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 9, 2014, at A14. However, the Utah State Tax Commission reversed itself yet again,
issuing new guidance stating that legally married same-sex couples will be considered married
for purposes of state income tax filings for 2013. Utah State Income Tax Comm’n, Individual
Income Tax Returns for Same-Sex Couples for Tax Year 2013 (Jan. 15, 2014),
http://tax.utah.gov/notice/2014-01-15.pdf.
144. Utah State Income Tax Comm’n, Individual Income Tax Returns for Same-Sex Couples
for Tax Year 2013 (Jan. 15, 2014), http://tax.utah.gov/notice/2014-01-15.pdf.
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the same-sex couples who were married during the brief seventeen145
day period when same-sex marriage was allowed in Utah. The
guidance also encompasses same-sex couples who were residents of
Utah and legally married outside the state, as long as they were
146
married by the end of 2013. The Utah guidance is limited to the
2013 tax year, however.
Thus, four nonrecognition states have permitted same-sex
couples to file joint state tax returns, even though each
constitutionally prohibits same-sex marriage. In contrast, eighteen
nonrecognition states have instructed married same-sex taxpayers to
file individual state income tax returns. The two markedly different
approaches adopted by nonrecognition states have created an
interesting mix of state tax policies.
B. Answering the Economic Impact Question: Examples
In the wake of Windsor, tax commentators noted that
recognition of same-sex marriage for federal tax purposes could have
147
substantial financial implications for some couples. But how does
state recognition or nonrecognition affect married same-sex couples?
State income tax revenue constitutes a significant part of total state
148
tax revenue. The analysis below considers the economic impact of
recognizing or not recognizing married same-sex couples for state
income tax purposes.
To illustrate how filing status affects tax liability, I use two
hypothetical same-sex couples and estimate the tax impact of allowing

145. Id. The Tax Notice simply provides that “same-sex couples who are eligible to file a
joint federal income tax return and who elect to file jointly, may also file a joint 2013 Utah
Individual Income Tax Return . . . .” Id.
146. Dan Harrie, Utah Tax Officials Allow Joint Filing for Married Same-Sex Couples, SALT
LAKE TRIB., Jan. 16, 2014, http://www.sltrib.com/sltrib/politics/57406343-90/tax-sex-couplesstate.html.csp.
147. See, e.g., David J. Herzig, Same-Sex Marriage and Estate Taxes: Why Windsor Is Still at
Issue, STATE TAX NOTES, Oct. 8, 2013, available at LEXIS, 2013 TNT 195-5 (highlighting the
economic impact of the IRS Ruling on estate taxes); David J. Herzig, The Tax Implications of
Windsor, TAXPROF BLOG (June 27, 2013), http://taxprof.typepad.com/taxprof_blog/2013/06/
herzig-tax.html (last visited Aug. 26, 2014) (describing how same-sex taxpayers will be impacted,
with some married same-sex couples now owing more tax).
148. Personal income tax accounted for 34 percent of state tax revenue in 2010. NAT’L
CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, STATE PERSONAL INCOME TAXES, 2012, at 1 (Mar. 5,
2013), available at http://www.ncsl.org/research/fiscal-policy/state-personal-income-taxes-2012
.aspx.
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149

them to file joint state income tax returns. First, I calculate what
these couples owe in state income tax when each spouse files as a
single individual. Then I estimate the couples’ tax payments as if they
were instead permitted to use the married-filing-jointly status. Both
hypotheticals assume a childless household with only wage income
150
and no itemized deductions. Assume the couple resides in a state
with a progressive tax rate structure, with different brackets for single
151
and married-filing-jointly filers:
Single
Income
Rate
$0+
2%
$12,500+
4%
$50,000+
6%
Married Filing Jointly
Income
Rate
$0+
2%
$25,000+
4%
$100,000+
6%
1. A Household with Disparate Incomes. Suppose that Spouse A
earns $80,000 and Spouse B earns $20,000. They reside in a
nonrecognition state and are required to file as single individuals.
152
After all deductions and exemptions, the AGI for Spouse A is
$80,000, and the taxable income is $75,500. Spouse A will pay tax at
the rate of 2 percent for the first $12,500, 4 percent for all income up

149. Note that filing status has a tangible economic impact only in states with progressive
taxation. See infra note 151.
150. For purposes of these calculations, I adopt Louisiana’s basic rate structure (which
determines taxable income based on federal AGI), but not its exemptions and deductions. My
hypothetical applies a standard deduction of $4,000 for taxpayers filing as single and $8,000 for
taxpayers filing as married filing jointly. The personal exemption is $500. Furthermore, I assume
that there are no estimated adjustments to income (such as IRA contributions or moving
expenses) and that federal AGI is therefore the same as the wage income.
151. Thirty-four states have a progressive income tax structure, meaning that as taxable
incomes increase, so do effective tax rates. Matthew Glans, Research & Commentary:
Progressive Taxation, THE HEARTLAND INST. (July 15, 2013), http://heartland.org/policydocuments/research-commentary-progressive-taxation (last visited Aug. 26, 2014).
152. Each spouse can only claim one personal exemption (for himself or herself) of $500 and
will be limited to the single taxpayer’s standard deduction of $4,000. See supra note 150.
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to $50,000, and 6 percent for all income over $50,000, generating an
income tax liability of $3,280. Spouse B has an AGI of $20,000 and a
taxable income of $15,500. Spouse B will pay tax at the rate of 2
percent for the first $12,500 and 4 percent for the remainder of his
taxable income. Spouse B will owe a total of $370 in state income
taxes. Therefore, the combined state income tax liability for Spouse A
and Spouse B is $3,650.
Now suppose that the couple may file joint returns. Their
combined wages are $100,000, and after all exemptions and standard
153
deductions, their taxable income is $91,000. In this case, the tax will
be assessed at 2 percent for the first $25,000 and 4 percent for the
remainder, leaving the couple with a joint state income tax liability of
$3,140.
Therefore, because Spouses A and B cannot file a joint return,
they are unable to take advantage of a marriage bonus of $510. Their
household tax burden is higher if they file as two single individuals.
2. A Household with Two High-Income Earners. Suppose that
Spouse C earns $100,000 and Spouse D also earns $100,000. Living in
a nonrecognition state, each spouse files as a single individual. After
154
all deductions and exemptions, the taxable income for each spouse
is $95,500. Each will pay tax at the rate of 2 percent for the first
$12,500, 4 percent for all income up to $50,000, and 6 percent for all
income over $50,000, leading to a state income tax liability of $4,480
each. Therefore, the combined state income tax liability for these
spouses (computed as if they were not married) is $8,960.
If Spouse C and Spouse D are allowed to file joint state tax
155
returns, their combined taxable income will be $191,000. Assuming
the marginal tax brackets specific to the married-filing-jointly status
apply, their joint state income tax liability is again $8,960.
However, if a state’s rate structure and brackets for married
filers are not simply double those for single filers, a married couple
156
such as Spouses C and D could face a marriage penalty. The
153. The filing spouse can claim a personal exemption for himself and also one for his
spouse, for a total of $1,000. The standard deduction for a taxpayer using the married-filingjointly status is $8,000. See supra note 150.
154. See supra note 152.
155. See supra note 153.
156. Some states double bracket widths for joint filers. Others increase but do not double
brackets for joint filers. For a list of state income tax rates, both for individuals and joint filers,
see TAX FOUND., STATE INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX RATES 2000-2013, available at
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marriage penalty applies when the combined tax liability of a married
couple filing jointly is greater than the sum of each individual
157
spouse’s tax liabilities, computed as if each spouse were single. The
marriage penalty usually applies when both spouses work and have
relatively equal incomes. Thus, for a married couple like Spouses C
and D, where both spouses earn relatively equal and high incomes,
joint filing could result in a marriage penalty, depending on the state’s
158
rate structure and brackets for married filers.
C. Other Economic Impacts
Even though the rate structure’s impact on married versus single
taxpayers might be a mixed bag, nonrate-structure items such as the
earned income credit and health insurance deductions for married
spouses can be quite significant. For example, Wisconsin’s tax
guidance for same-sex couples states that although an employee may
include a same-sex spouse on employer-provided health insurance,
when filing a Wisconsin income tax return as single, the income
calculation must include the fair market value of the same-sex
159
spouse’s health insurance. If one estimates the fair market value of
the same-sex spouse’s health insurance to be $500 per month, this

http://taxfoundation.org/article_ns/state-individual-income-tax-rates-2000-2013. For example,
North Carolina’s 2013 tax brackets for married filers used amounts that were less than twice
those for single filers. Id. For individuals, earnings up to $12,750 were taxed at 6 percent.
However, for joint filers, only earnings up to $21,250 were taxed at 6 percent. Id. Thus, a
married couple could get pushed into the next tax bracket even though on an individual basis,
one or both partners have earnings below $12,750. Id. Other states that do not “double up”
include Georgia, Minnesota, and Wisconsin. Id. Still other states, such as Arkansas, Delaware,
and Virginia, do not have different brackets for married filers. Id. For an explanation of the
impact of tax rate structure and brackets on the marriage penalty, see generally Lawrence
Zelenak, Doing Something About Marriage Penalties: A Guide for the Perplexed, 54 TAX L.
REV. 1 (2000).
157. See James Alm & Leslie A. Whittington, Marriage Penalty in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
TAXATION AND TAX POLICY, at 251–52 (Joseph J. Cordes, Robert D. Ebel & Jane G. Gravelle,
eds., 2005) (explaining how the combined income tax liability of a married couple could exceed
their combined income tax liabilities as two single individuals).
158. Lest one think that states are providing some sort of benefit by forcing married samesex couples to “escape” the marriage penalty, the words of Professor Anthony Infanti hold
otherwise: “Can my recognition as a full member of society be bought at the cheap price of an
exemption from the marriage penalty . . . ?” Infanti, supra note 44, at 765.
159. Wis. Dep’t of Revenue, Instructions for Schedule S (2013), available at
http://www.revenue.wi.gov/forms/2013/ScheduleS_inst.pdf. Wisconsin does not provide explicit
guidance on how to value a same-sex spouse’s benefits. Id. One possible way to value the
taxable income is to measure the increased employer contribution for health insurance when an
employee signs up a spouse. Id.
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160

now constitutes a $6,000 increase in taxable income. This increase is
likely to make a dent in a married same-sex taxpayer’s budget. For
example, a Wisconsin taxpayer with a taxable income of $50,000
would pay $2,317 in state income tax. If the fair market value of his
same-sex spouse’s health coverage is added to his taxable income, his
state income tax burden increases by nearly $400 to $2,707.
Most states have remained silent on whether employee benefits
such as health insurance should be included in the income calculation,
161
restricting all guidance to the issue of filing status. This raises
additional questions as to whether a same-sex taxpayer is required to
report such benefits as part of her state income calculations. Thus, the
economic implications of state recognition or nonrecognition of samesex marriage go beyond the size of couples’ income tax liabilities to
encompass considerations regarding employer-provided fringe
benefits.
IV. PROCEDURAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONCERNS
The Windsor majority recognized that DOMA unequally
affected married same-sex couples, burdening their lives in visible and
public ways. The Court specifically noted that DOMA forced couples
to follow a complicated procedure to file their state and federal tax
162
returns jointly. In considering how same-sex couples can challenge
new state income tax rules requiring them to file state income tax
returns that do not conform to their federal returns, this Note
suggests two avenues for them to explore: administrative-law
challenges and constitutional challenges.
Section A proposes two potential administrative-law challenges
that could be raised against state tax-agency decisions requiring samesex couples to follow different tax-preparation procedures in the
wake of the IRS Ruling. This Section uses several states’
administrative-procedure frameworks to illustrate each challenge,
and explores the standard of deference that courts might apply in
evaluating these agency decisions. Section B argues that same-sex
couples might also successfully raise constitutional challenges based

160. For example, the State of Wisconsin Group Health Insurance Program provides a
range of fair market values to be used in making such a calculation, with most values being close
to $500 per month. See Monthly Fair Market Value (FMV) – Imputed Income Estimates (Sept.
26, 2013), http://uwservice.wisc.edu/docs/publications/imputed-income-state-active-2014.pdf.
161. See supra notes 120–35 and accompanying text.
162. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2694 (2013).
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on equal protection principles as articulated in Windsor. Section C
discusses the likelihood of success for both types of challenges.
A. Administrative-Law Challenges to State Action
As a preliminary matter, one must consider whether tax rules
and regulations are even subject to the requirements of state
administrative law. The notion of tax exceptionalism from the norms
of administrative law has long persisted amongst tax lawyers,
163
administrators, and courts alike. The Supreme Court recently ruled,
however, that the validity of federal tax regulations must be evaluated
using the same standard of review that applies to regulations issued
by all other federal agencies, making it clear that tax is not exempt
164
from the requirements of administrative law. Taxpayers can now
invoke administrative-law principles, such as the Administrative
Procedure Act’s (APA’s) arbitrary-and-capricious standard, to
165
challenge IRS actions. This Note is concerned specifically with
regulations enacted by state tax authorities. Whether state tax
regulations are vulnerable to direct challenges based on applicable
166
administrative-law norms is a complex question. State courts have
frequently looked to state administrative-law standards in

163. See, e.g., Paul Caron, Tax Myopia, or Mamas Don’t Let Your Babies Grow Up to Be
Tax Lawyers, 13 VA. TAX REV. 517, 519–31 (1994) (describing how the “tax is different”
mindset has led to tax exceptionalism in the law); Anthony C. Infanti, LGBT Taxpayers: A
Collision of Others, 13 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 1, 8–17 (2012) (listing a series of examples showing
the pervasiveness of the notion of tax exceptionalism); Lawrence Zelenak, Maybe Just a Little
Bit Special After All?, 63 DUKE L.J. 1897, 1906–18 (2014) (offering a defense of the taxexceptionalist position).
164. Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 704, 713 (2011)
(“We see no reason why our review of tax regulations should not be guided by agency expertise
pursuant to Chevron to the same extent as our review of other regulations.”). Chevron provides
a two-step test for judicial deference: (1) if the statute is unambiguous, the court should apply
the statute without deference to the agency’s view, but (2) if the statute is ambiguous, the court
should defer to the agency’s interpretation if that interpretation is at least reasonable. Chevron
U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984).
165. Patrick J. Smith, The APA’s Arbitrary and Capricious Standard and IRS Regulations,
TAX NOTES TODAY, July 16, 2012, available at LEXIS, 2012 TNT 137-4. Smith describes how
IRS regulations are particularly vulnerable to challenge under the arbitrary-and-capricious
standard because the IRS generally does not explain the reasons for its rules. Id. at 274. A
challenge based on the APA’s arbitrary-and-capricious standard is one based on procedural
grounds: did the agency engage in reasoned decision-making and did it articulate a satisfactory
explanation for its action? Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass’n Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983).
166. For a discussion of these complexities, see infra Part IV.A.2.
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167

determining the validity of agency regulations. State departments of
revenue generally qualify as agencies and are therefore subject to the
168
requirements of their respective state analogs to the APA. In this
context, two lines of attack may prove fruitful.
1. State Statutes Mandating Conformity to the Federal Income Tax
System. Almost immediately after the IRS Ruling was issued, tax
experts recognized that nonrecognition states with some level of
169
federal-state tax-base conformity would face a dilemma. Perhaps
states that instruct married same-sex couples not to use the
information provided on their federal income tax return while
preparing their state income tax returns are breaking their own laws
mandating conformity to the federal income tax system.
On December 30, 2013, two married same-sex couples sued the
170
Kansas Department of Revenue, adopting this very approach. They
alleged that the Department violated state tax laws that couple the
171
state income tax code to the federal tax code. The argument is
simple: same-sex couples should refer to state law requiring the state
income tax code to conform to the federal tax code; in the absence of
legislation repealing this statutory requirement, they must be
permitted to file returns based on the state statute (that is, to
reference their federal tax return and filing status for state tax
167. See, e.g., Kokochak v. W. Va. State Lottery Comm’n, 695 S.E.2d 185, 189 (W. Va. 2010)
(considering the validity of rules issued by the state lottery commission in light of the state
APA); Labor Comm’r v. Littlefield, 153 P.3d 26, 44 (Nev. 2007) (holding a Labor
Commissioner’s determination to delete certain worker classifications to be invalid because it
did not comply with the state APA’s notice-and-hearing requirements); N.J. Educ. Ass’n v.
Librera, 840 A.2d 266, 268–69 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004) (considering whether a
Department of Education manual was subject to the state APA’s procedural requirements);
Parker v. Gorczyk, 787 A.2d 494, 495 (Vt. 2001) (holding that the state Department of
Corrections cannot issue a furlough policy without complying with the Vermont APA’s
rulemaking procedures); J.R. Simplot Co. v. Idaho State Tax Comm’n, 820 P.2d 1206, 1222–23
(Idaho 1991) (holding a state tax commission interpretation invalid because it failed to supply
the normal safeguards that should exist when an agency construes a statute); Miss. State Tax
Comm’n v. Vicksburg Terminal, 592 So. 2d 959, 961 (Miss. 1991) (applying the arbitrary-andcapricious standard to tax rules promulgated by the state tax commission).
168. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 77-502 (West 2014), which defines a “state agency” to
include any department, bureau, board, authority, agency, or commission and excludes only the
judiciary and legislature; and OHIO REV. CODE ANN § 119.01 (West 2014), which expressly
subjects the state Department of Taxation to the state’s APA.
169. See, e.g., Koklanaris, supra note 95, at 694 (quoting CPAs and tax consultants on the
“tough decisions” facing states).
170. Petition at 1, 8–10, Nelson v. Kan. Dep’t of Revenue, No. 13C1465 (Kan. Dist. Ct. Dec.
30, 2013).
171. Id. at 8.
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172

purposes). For example, the Kansas legislature has enacted tax
legislation specifically titled, “Conformity with Federal Code,” which
states that “any term used in this act shall have the same meaning as
when used in a comparable context in the federal internal revenue
173
code [sic].” Presumably, this would include the IRS Ruling, which
concludes that the terms “spouse,” “marriage,” “husband and wife,”
“husband,” and “wife”—as used in the Code—should be interpreted
174
to include same-sex spouses. Further legislation in Kansas provides
that “all returns required by this act shall be made as nearly as
practical in the same form as the corresponding form of income tax
175
return by the United States.”
Several other states have similar legislation. Virginia’s tax code
provides that “any term used in this chapter shall have the same
meaning as when used in a comparable context in the laws of the
United States relating to federal income taxes, unless a different
176
meaning is clearly required.” North Carolina tax legislation defines
“married individual” as one who is married and is considered married
177
under section 7703 of the federal Code.
Married same-sex couples in these states may therefore argue
that the relevant tax authorities are violating state income tax codes
by requiring legally married same-sex couples to file state income tax
returns that do not conform to their federal returns. State laws clearly
direct tax authorities to follow the federal government’s lead on
178
income tax matters. The success of such an argument depends on a

172. For example, in New York, under DOMA, even after the state recognized same-sex
marriages undertaken in other states, married same-sex couples had to file their state tax
returns as if they were single. This was because of a state statute, Tax Law section 607(b),
mandating conformity with the federal tax base. The problem was later corrected with the
passage of the Marriage Equality Act. See Patricia A. Cain, The New York Marriage Equality
Act and the Income Tax, 5 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 634, 638–40 (2012) (describing how New York
had long recognized valid same-sex marriages from other jurisdictions, except for the purposes
of state taxation—due to the conformity statute).
173. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 79-32, 109 (West 2014).
174. Rev. Rul. 2013-17, 2013-38 I.R.B. 200.
175. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 79-3221 (West 2014).
176. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-301 (West 2014). Ohio has identical statutory language
regarding income taxation. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5747.01 (West 2014).
177. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-134.1 (West 2014). Wisconsin has similar language incorporating
the Code’s definitions of “married person” and “spouse.” WIS. STAT. ANN. § 71.01(8) (West
2014).
178. See supra notes 173, 176 and accompanying text.
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state-by-state determination of the degree of conformity between a
179
state’s tax code and the federal Code.
The IRS Ruling has placed state tax agencies in the unenviable
position of deciding whether to abide by statutes mandating federalstate tax-base conformity, or else state constitutional or statutory
provisions banning the recognition of same-sex marriage. Several tax
agencies have explicitly cited these state bans when issuing new
180
guidance for married same-sex couples.
Therefore, same-sex
taxpayers must also persuade courts that the agency was required to
resolve the issue in favor of the state’s federal conformity statute.
Same-sex taxpayers could invoke a longstanding canon of
181
construction—that specific statutes control over general ones —to
argue that a state’s general statutory or constitutional provision must
yield to its specific statute mandating federal-state tax-base
182
conformity.
183
The plaintiffs in Nelson v. Kansas Department of Revenue
argued along these lines. They claimed that the general language
contained in the Kansas Constitution and statutory provision banning
same-sex marriage did not address the question of filing status for
184
income tax purposes. On the other hand, the state conformity
statute clearly directed that federal law control determinations of
185
filing status. The plaintiffs cited cases stating that when a general
186
statute conflicts with a specific one, the specific statute must control.
This is not an invincible argument, however, because agencies
could persuasively invoke contrary legislative intent, as manifested in
187
statutory provisions banning recognition of same-sex marriage. For
179. For example, while Idaho legislation states that “[h]usbands and wives shall, if they
elect to file a joint return for federal purposes, be required to file a joint return for state
purposes,” it contains no cross-reference to the Internal Revenue Code for the definition of
“husband” and “wife.” IDAHO CODE ANN. § 63-3031 (West 2014). Therefore, married same-sex
couples in Idaho will have a weaker claim than those in Kansas, Virginia, Ohio, and North
Carolina. See supra notes 175–77 and accompanying text.
180. See supra notes 117, 120, 123, 125, 133–35 and accompanying text.
181. See Simpson v. United States, 435 U.S. 6, 15 (1978) (“[G]ive[] precedence to the terms
of the more specific statute where a general statute and a specific statute speak to the same
concern, even if the general provision was enacted later.”).
182. See infra notes 184–86 and accompanying text.
183. Petition, Nelson v. Kan. Dep’t of Revenue, No. 13C1465 (Kan. Dist. Ct. Dec. 30, 2013).
184. Id. at 17.
185. Id. at 8–9.
186. Id. at 17.
187. See, e.g., Meyer v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 909 N.E.2d 106, 111 (Ohio 2009) (“[W]here
there is no manifest legislative intent that the general provision prevail over the specific
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example, the Missouri governor’s Executive Order, discussed in Part
III.A.2, reads the state’s tax conformity statute as overriding its
constitutional ban. In Louisiana, however, the tax authorities
interpret their state’s constitutional ban as superseding the state
188
conformity statute. In this way, each state’s executive branch
reached the opposite conclusion when confronted with the same
dilemma. Overall, although the specific-over-general argument is
189
unlikely to be a winning one for same-sex taxpayers and their allies,
it might be more compelling in a state (such as North Carolina) where
the conformity statute speaks with unusual specificity on the issue of
190
marriage itself.
2. State Agencies Issuing New Regulations Without Public
Comment or Standard Legal Review. A second potential argument
would be based on administrative-rulemaking procedures. Such an
attack entails arguing that, in adopting and implementing the rules,
regulations, and policies dealing with married same-sex couples, tax
authorities failed to follow the proper state statutory requirements for
administrative rulemaking, such as a public notice-and-comment
191
192
process
or opportunities for a public hearing.
Indeed, the
chairman of Utah’s Tax Commission recognized that the
Commission’s decision preventing same-sex couples from filing a joint
state income tax return failed to follow the agency’s decisionmaking
193
norms.

provision, the specific provision applies.”); Butler v. State, 637 S.E.2d 688, 689 (Ga. 2006) (“[A]
specific statute will prevail over a general statute, absent any indication of a contrary legislative
intent.”); Nucor Corp. v. Gen. Bearing Corp., 423 S.E.2d 747, 751 (N.C. 1992) (“[T]he
particular, specific statute will be construed as controlling, absent a clear legislative intent to the
contrary.”).
188. See supra notes 117 and 137 and accompanying text.
189. While most conformity statutes speak specifically about tax, they speak generally about
marriage. State mini-DOMAs, on the other hand, speak specifically about marriage.
190. See supra note 177 and accompanying text.
191. See infra note 195 and accompanying text. For example, the Illinois APA mandates two
rounds of notice-and-comment for proposed rulemaking. See generally 5 ILL. COMP. STAT.
100/5-40 (2002).
192. For example, the Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act states that agencies shall hold a
public hearing on a proposed rule if “another state agency, ten interested persons, or an
interested association having not fewer than ten members request a public hearing.” UTAH
CODE ANN. 63G-3-302 (West 2014).
193. See Dan Harrie & Lee Davidson, Utah Rejects Joint Tax Filings by Same-Sex Couples,
THE SALT LAKE TRIB. (Oct. 10, 2013, 6:21 PM), http://www.sltrib.com/sltrib/politics/5698456490/utah-couples-state-sex.html.csp (describing how the Utah Tax Commission Chairman
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In determining whether a state agency has followed appropriate
procedures, one must first decide whether the relevant agency’s
regulation, policy, or guidance for same-sex taxpayers is a “rule”
subject to the rulemaking requirements of the state’s APA.
Importantly, rules are not limited solely to regulations and formal
interpretive pronouncements from administrative agencies, but also
encompass any agency standard or policy that generally applies to the
194
public. Rules that fail to meet the promulgation requirements are
susceptible to challenges regarding their validity. For the purposes of
illustrating such a challenge, this Note considers Louisiana’s
administrative-rulemaking procedures.
195
The Louisiana Administrative Procedure Act (LAPA)
establishes a specific rulemaking process designed to guarantee that
the public is informed of an agency’s intent to issue a rule, has the
opportunity to comment on the rule, and receives an explanation as
196
to why a particular rule was chosen. Arguably, the Department of
Revenue’s Revenue Information Bulletin (RIB) falls squarely within
197
the definition of a rule as set out in the LAPA. The RIB applies
generally, impacting the entire segment of the population to which it
is addressed: married same-sex couples. Furthermore, it has the force
and effect of law—compelling same-sex taxpayers to follow its
dictates. Therefore, the RIB should be subject to the LAPA’s specific
198
199
procedures for rulemaking, which are mandatory. In an earlier
acknowledged that it might have been better to make this decision in an open, public meeting,
as is normally the case with commission rules and decisions).
194. Bruce P. Ely, William T. Thistle, II, & H. Michael Madsen, State Administrative
Procedure Acts: Procedural Avenues to Attack Faulty Regulations and Assessments, 19 J.
MULTISTATE TAXATION & INCENTIVES, Aug. 2009, at 6, 9.
195. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 49:950–:999.25 (2014).
196. Id. § 49:953.
197. According to the state APA: “‘Rule’ means each agency statement, guide, or
requirement for conduct or action . . . which has general applicability and the effect of
implementing or interpreting substantive law or policy, or which prescribes the procedure or
practice requirements of the agency.” Id. § 49:951. The Department of Revenue website defines
a Revenue Information Bulletin as “an informal statement of information issued for the public,
announcing general information that the department believes to be useful in complying with the
laws administered.” Policy Documents, LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE (Aug. 5, 2014),
http://www.revenue.louisiana.gov/sections/lawspolicies/pd.aspx?ribs=show.
198. These procedures include ninety days’ notice for intended agency rulemaking,
submission of oral or written comments by the public, a hearing, response to comments and
submissions, and a preamble explaining the basis and rationale for the rule. LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 49:953.
199. “No rule . . . is valid unless adopted in substantial compliance with [the Louisiana
Administrative Procedure Act].” Id. § 49:954.
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case involving an income tax rule issued by the Department of
Revenue, the Louisiana Court of Appeals stated that if an agency
fails to submit a rule to the notice-and-promulgation requirements of
200
LAPA, the rule is invalid and unenforceable. As such, although the
RIB can be considered a “rule,” the Department of Revenue’s failure
to submit it to the notice-and-promulgation requirement of LAPA
raises concerns regarding its validity and enforceability.
Although Louisiana’s rulemaking requirements apply to tax
agencies, some states explicitly exempt tax authorities from their
201
rulemaking requirements.
Same-sex-marriage taxpayers must
therefore consult the rulemaking provisions set out in each state’s
APA (or an equivalent thereof). Furthermore, not all state courts
construe the term “rule” liberally and have, in some instances,
concluded that an agency statement or policy is merely a guideline
202
and therefore not subject to the requirements of the state’s APA.
Therefore, the likelihood of success for such a challenge will differ
depending on state case law and statutory provisions.
3. Standard of Deference. A key question for taxpayers seeking
to challenge state tax-authority rules and guidelines on the basis of
administrative law is the appropriate standard of judicial deference
toward these tax policies. The deference doctrine and the relationship
between courts and administrative agencies are important points of
203
intersection between state tax law and administrative law.
As discussed earlier, the Supreme Court has held that tax rules
are subject to administrative-law norms and that the IRS is entitled to
204
Chevron deference. On the federal level, the APA’s arbitrary-andcapricious standard requires that agencies give reasoned explanations
205
for their decisions. This standard applies to review of all agency

200. Star Enter. v. State ex rel. Dep’t of Revenue & Taxation, 676 So. 2d 827, 832 (La. 1996).
201. The North Carolina Department of Revenue is exempted from the notice, hearing, and
public-comment requirements for rulemaking. It is also exempt from the requirement that an
agency provide a concise written explanation for why it adopted a rule. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. §
150B-1(d)(4) (West 2014). Similarly, the Indiana Department of Revenue is exempt from state
APA requirements. IND. CODE § 4-21.5-2-4(a)(9) (2013).
202. Ely et al., supra note 194, at 9.
203. Steve R. Johnson, Judicial Deference to State Tax Agencies – An Overview, STATE TAX
NOTES, Nov. 29, 2010, available at LEXIS, 58 STATE TAX NOTES 633, 633.
204. See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
205. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012) (creating an arbitrary-and-capricious standard).
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206

actions, including informal rulemaking. For example, in a 2012 case,
207
Dominion Resources Inc., v. United States, the Federal Circuit Court
of Appeals invalidated a tax regulation based on this common
administrative-law principle. The court held that the regulation was
not a permissible construction of the Code under Chevron and that
the Treasury’s regulation violated the APA’s arbitrary-and-capricious
208
standard. It is unclear, however, whether less formal administrative
guidance (such as revenue rulings) warrants Chevron deference or
whether it should receive less deferential review.
On the state level, married same-sex taxpayers should examine
the deference standards espoused by state courts in previous tax
cases. The question of whether rules issued by tax authorities receive
209
deference, and if so, to what degree, remains unsettled. Judicial
review of state tax authorities varies greatly, with judges applying a
range of deferential standards—from a high level of deference, to
Chevron deference, to little or no deference—to interpretations and
210
positions of tax authorities. Several states have applied Chevron
211
deference in cases involving agency interpretation of tax provisions.
In other cases, states have applied the Supreme Court’s Auer v.
212
Robbins principle, which states that an agency’s interpretation of its
own regulation controls unless it is clearly inconsistent with the

206. The Supreme Court has held that the appropriate standard of review for informal
agency actions is the arbitrary-and-capricious test of section 706(2)(A) of the APA. Citizens to
Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971).
207. Dominion Res., Inc. v. United States, 681 F.3d 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
208. Id.
209. See Ely et al., supra note 194, at 15–17 (describing the deference accorded by various
state courts).
210. See Johnson, supra note 203 (describing six broad categories of state deference
regimes); see also Ann Graham, Chevron Lite: How Much Deference Should Courts Give to
State Agency Interpretation?, 68 LA. L. REV. 1105, 1109–10 (2008) (“Existing state models range
along a continuum from express adoption of the Chevron doctrine to outright rejection of
Chevron’s applicability. A middle ground approach sounds very much like the federal Skidmore
test . . . .”); Michael Pappas, No Two-Stepping in the Laboratories: State Deference Standards
and Their Implications for Improving the Chevron Doctrine, 39 MCGEORGE L. REV. 977, 984
(2008) (“A survey of the fifty states’ equivalents to the Chevron doctrine shows an array of
different announced standards . . . .”).
211. See Steve R. Johnson, Chevron Deference to State Tax Agencies, STATE TAX NOTES,
Jan. 24, 2011, available at LEXIS, 59 STATE TAX NOTES 285, 286 (providing a list of state tax
cases applying Chevron deference).
212. Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997).
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213

However, same-sex taxpayers have two possible
regulation.
arguments that the generous Auer standard should not apply to
agency interpretations of their income tax filings: first, state statutes
mandating federal-state tax-base conformity are not ambiguous, and
second, the agency’s interpretation was not set out in the appropriate
214
manner.
Regardless, if married same-sex taxpayers cannot convince
courts that the informal tax guidance offered by state tax authorities
should be considered a “rule” subject to administrative-procedure
requirements, they might yet have room to maneuver. State tax
authorities cannot have their cake and eat it too—they cannot enjoy
the ease of issuing informal guidance yet legally obligate taxpayers to
follow it. Same-sex taxpayers could argue that informal
215
pronouncements do not carry significant weight. Had state tax
authorities addressed same-sex tax filings through formal agency
action, they would be entitled to greater deference and be less
susceptible to taxpayer challenges.
B. Constitutional Challenges to State Action
On top of the administrative concerns outlined above, state tax
rules and policies for married same-sex couples are also open to
constitutional challenges. Windsor’s holding was based on the Fifth
Amendment’s due process and equal protection principles, which do
216
not apply to states. According to the majority, DOMA revealed a
“desire to harm” same-sex couples whose “moral and sexual choices
217
the Constitution protects.”
It is reasonable to find similar
protections enshrined in the Fourteenth Amendment, which applies

213. See Steve R. Johnson, Deference to Tax Agencies’ Interpretation of Their Regulations,
STATE TAX NOTES, May 30, 2011, available at LEXIS, 60 STATE TAX NOTES 665, 665–66
(explaining Auer deference).
214. See id. at 666–68 (describing arguments that taxpayers can make against Auer-style
deference).
215. In Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576 (2000), the Supreme Court held that
“[i]nterpretations such as those in opinion letters—like interpretations contained in policy
statements, agency manuals, and enforcement guidelines, all of which lack the force of law—do
not warrant Chevron-style deference;” rather, opinion letters and more informal
pronouncements are merely “‘entitled to respect’ under . . . Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S.
134, 140 (1944), but only to the extent that those interpretations ha[d] the ‘power to persuade.’”
Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000).
216. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct 2675, 2693 (2013) (“[DOMA] violates basic due
process and equal protection principles applicable to the Federal Government.”).
217. Id. at 2694–95.
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to the states. Indeed, Justice Scalia emphasized this point in his
dissent, stating: “it is just a matter of listening and waiting for the
218
other shoe.” Arguably, the other shoe has dropped. Same-sex
couples in nonrecognition states have the ability to raise an equal
protection challenge to state tax rules based on the Fourteenth
Amendment. Indeed, some state tax agencies apparently anticipate
that they will be sued based on Fourteenth Amendment equal
219
protection principles. Below, this Note first considers the grounds
on which same-sex couples can make an equal protection claim, and
then turns to the standard of review.
1. The Basis for Claims. The Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment provides that no state “shall deny to any
220
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” To
establish an equal protection violation, a plaintiff “must prove
purposeful discrimination directed at an identifiable or suspect
221
class.” When a distinction in taxation is drawn along a “protected”
class line, the tax will arguably be seen as violating the Equal
222
Protection Clause. Nonrecognition states following the “Louisiana
Model” are therefore susceptible to equal protection challenges.
These states require legally married same-sex couples to file dummy
federal tax returns or complete additional worksheets, thereby
imposing a burden on a discrete set of married taxpayers and creating
a conflict with the Fourteenth Amendment. Burdening married samesex couples with filing requirements that they would not face if they
were married opposite-sex couples amounts to discrimination based
223
on what Professor Infanti calls “noneconomic characteristics.”

218. Id. at 2710 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
219. Charles S. Johnson, Official: Same-Sex Couples Who Marry Outside Montana Can’t File
State Taxes Jointly, MISSOULIAN Oct. 2, 2013, http://missoulian.com/news/local/official-samesex-couples-who-marry-outside-montana-can-t/article_30cae8ba-2b01-11e3-9ada-0019bb2963f4
.html (quoting an exchange between Senator Dick Barrett and Montana Revenue Department
Director Mike Kadas in which Kadas acknowledged that it was a “distinct possibility” that the
agency would be sued under the Equal Protection Clause).
220. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
221. Giano v. Senkowski, 54 F.3d 1050, 1057 (2d Cir. 1995) (citations omitted).
222. See, e.g., Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. Cnty. Comm’n., 488 U.S. 336, 345–46 (1989)
(holding that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause protects individuals from
state action that discriminates against them by subjecting them to taxes not imposed on others
of the same class).
223. Anthony C. Infanti, Taxing Civil Rights Gains, 16 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 319, 320
(2010).
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Arguably, these states have instituted tax practices that
subordinate married same-sex couples, subjecting them to burdens
not faced by other married couples. Same-sex-marriage taxpayers
should frame the constitutional issue as whether the state can
224
effectively deprive certain individuals of an existing marital status.
To this end, the argument that states must recognize marriages
performed in sister states is persuasive. When a state recognizes the
validity of certain marriages performed in other states that are not
legal in the state in question—such as incestuous marriages or the
marriage of minors—yet refuses to recognize a same-sex marriage
legally performed in another state, it could be violating the Equal
225
Protection Clause. Legally married same-sex taxpayers can argue
that the principal purpose of the tax policies adopted post-Windsor is
to deny recognition to their marriages and to treat them differently
than other legally married couples. Indeed, the Windsor majority
reached a similar conclusion, holding that DOMA undermined the
public significance of state-sanctioned marriages, “for it tells those
couples, and all the world, that their otherwise valid marriages are
226
unworthy of federal recognition.” The differential tax treatment of
two similarly situated groups is a solid basis for an equal protection
227
claim against state tax provisions. Here, an equal protection claim

224. State courts are likely to be more amenable to such a claim rather than one that frames
the issue as whether same-sex couples enjoy a constitutional right to marry in the state. See infra
note 243 and accompanying text.
225. See, e.g., Letter from Mary Williams, Or. Deputy Att’y Gen., to Michael Jordan, Chief
Operating Officer, Dep’t of Admin. Servs. (Oct. 16, 2013) (concluding that Oregon would
violate the Fourteenth Amendment equal protection rights of its residents if it declined to
recognize a same-sex marriage legally conducted in another state); see also Obergefell v. Kasich,
No. 1:13–cv–501, 2013 WL 3814262, at *1 (S.D. Ohio July 22, 2013) (describing how Ohio has
historically recognized out-of-state marriages between minors and first cousins, even if they are
not authorized under Ohio law, and holding that Ohio therefore may not single out out-of-state
same-sex marriages as legally unrecognizable); Ghassemi v. Ghassemi, 998 So. 2d 731, 743–44
(La. Ct. App. 2008) (holding that Louisiana will recognize a marriage between first cousins
contracted in a state where such a marriage is legal, even though first cousins cannot legally
marry in Louisiana).
226. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2694 (2013).
227. State courts have held that while the Equal Protection Clause “does not preclude the
state from drawing distinctions between different groups of individuals,” it “does require that
persons similarly situated with respect to the legitimate purpose of the law receive like
treatment.” See, e.g., Shelton v. Phalen, 519 P.2d 754, 757 (Kan. 1974).
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narrowly framed to apply to migratory marriages will likely be more
228
successful than one that also includes evasive marriages.
2. The Standard of Review. Challenges to state tax provisions
based on equal protection principles will generally be subject to
rational-basis review—the same standard courts apply in evaluating
equal protection challenges to state commercial regulations and
229
economic legislation. To pass rational-basis review, a legislative
classification must be rationally related to a legitimate governmental
230
purpose. Same-sex taxpayers should rely on the equal protection
arguments advanced in Windsor, which held that “discriminations of
231
an unusual character . . . suggest careful consideration.” Although
the majority opinion did not clearly articulate the level of scrutiny
232
being applied, it used the language of rational-basis review. As
Justice Scalia noted, however, the Court seemed to be applying
233
something greater than traditional rational-basis review.
The
Court’s disinclination to follow familiar equal protection analysis
might have stemmed from the majority’s desire to maintain flexibility
in anticipation of subsequent litigation involving state bans on samesex marriage.
C. The Likelihood of Success
This Section considers same-sex taxpayers’ likelihood of
succeeding on challenges grounded in the equal protection and
administrative-law principles outlined above. The outcome of an
equal protection challenge to state tax provisions aimed at same-sex
234
taxpayers will likely turn on the level of scrutiny applied and
228. For a discussion of evasive versus migratory marriages, see Andrew Koppelman,
Interstate Recognition of Same-Sex Marriages and Civil Unions: A Handbook for Judges, 153 U.
PA. L. REV. 2143, 2145 (2005).
229. See Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, 516 U.S. 325, 345 (1996) (“[W]e continue to measure the
equal protection of economic legislation by a ‘rational basis’ test . . . .”).
230. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996) (“[I]f a law neither burdens a
fundamental right nor targets a suspect class, we will uphold the legislative classification so long
as it bears a rational relation to some legitimate end.”).
231. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2692 (quoting Romer, 517 U.S. at 633).
232. See id. at 2696 (“The federal statute is invalid, for no legitimate purpose overcomes the
purpose and effect to disparage and to injure those whom the State, by its marriage laws, sought
to protect in personhood and dignity.”).
233. See id. at 2706 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that the majority “does not apply anything
that resembles th[e] deferential framework” of rational-basis review (emphasis omitted)).
234. Post-Windsor, courts are debating the level of scrutiny to be applied in cases
challenging state bans on same-sex marriage. See, e.g., SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Abbott
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whether the state agency’s action has a discriminatory impact on a
235
certain group of taxpayers. On the federal level, equal protection
challenges to federal tax provisions have been unsuccessful, given that
distinctions drawn in tax statutes are almost universally upheld as
236
reasonable legislative choices in the administration of tax law. On
the state level, before Windsor, state courts that applied rational-basis
review to state action challenged for discriminating on the basis of
sexual orientation upheld agency actions in the vast majority of
237
cases.
To prevail on an equal protection claim under rational-basis
review, same-sex taxpayers must prove that “[t]he principal purpose
[of the state same-sex tax-filing rules] is to impose inequality, not for
238
other reasons like governmental efficiency.” A key element of any
successful claim is to argue that the challenged rule cannot withstand
constitutional scrutiny because the state cannot justify the unequal
treatment its tax rule inflicts. The Windsor Court noted that DOMA
was an “unusual deviation” which was “strong evidence of a law
239
having the purpose and effect of disapproval of the class.” Same-sex
taxpayers could easily draw parallels to the state tax rules under
scrutiny here, characterizing them as unusual deviations from a
longstanding tradition of conformity. At the same time, states are
likely to cite Windsor’s federalism underpinnings and the majority’s
lengthy discussion of states’ traditional authority to define and
240
regulate marriage. Such a defense would have its limits, however,
because as the Court repeatedly noted, such state authority over
241
marriage was “subject to constitutional guarantees.”
Thus, married same-sex taxpayers raising an equal protection
challenge have a compelling claim that state tax provisions are not

Labs., 740 F.3d 471, 482–84 (9th Cir. 2014) (applying heightened scrutiny to classifications based
on sexual orientation); Bourke v. Beshear, No. 3:13-cv-750, 2014 WL 556729, at *4–5 (W.D. Ky.
Feb. 12, 2014) (discussing the applicable standard of review); Bostic v. Rainey, 970 F. Supp. 2d
456, 482 (E.D. Va. 2014) aff’d sub nom. Bostiv v. Schaefer, Nos. 14-1167, 14-1169, 14-1173, 2014
WL 3702493 (4th Cir. July 28, 2014) (declining to apply heightened scrutiny because Virginia’s
same-sex marriage ban would fail under even the most deferential level of scrutiny).
235. See supra note 221–22 and accompanying text.
236. Cain, supra note 23, at 510.
237. Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Equal Protection by Law: Federal Antidiscrimination
Legislation After Morrison and Kimel, 110 YALE L. J. 441, 466 n.132 (2000).
238. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2694.
239. Id. at 2693.
240. Id. at 2692.
241. Id.
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treating like groups—that is, married couples—alike and that the
provisions are intended to discriminate against a distinct group of
taxpayers. The state would have to persuade courts that the
challenged tax provisions are supported by sufficient state interests—
not an easy task in the wake of Windsor and its discourse on equality.
Although an equal protection challenge might succeed under
242
Windsor principles, a suit based on administrative-law procedures is
243
Administrative
likely to be more palatable to state courts.
challenges, however, face their own set of obstacles. As mentioned
earlier, several states exempt their revenue or tax agencies from the
244
states’ APA requirements. For states that do not, married same-sex
taxpayers should anticipate that the relevant state tax agency will
claim that any guidance it issued does not rise to the level of a “rule”
or “regulation,” and is therefore not subject to the state’s APA
245
rulemaking procedures.
It is doubtful that state agencies will prevail on such claims,
however, given that the new tax provisions sharply depart from the
agencies’ longstanding application of prior statutory language
246
mandating federal-state tax-base conformity.
Furthermore, as
argued by the plaintiffs in Nelson v. Kansas Department of Revenue,
agency instructions or guidance—“nonrules”—may not give rise to
247
any legal duty, whereas agency policies, which apply generally and
248
have the effect of law, are considered to be rules. Courts are likely
to express reservations about deferring to agency interpretations
made informally, which is the manner in which most state tax
249
provisions were issued in the wake of the IRS Ruling. Of course, if

242. See supra note 226 and accompanying text.
243. Telephone Interview with David J. Brown, The Law Office of David J. Brown (Jan. 3,
2014). Brown is the attorney for the petitioners in Nelson v. Kan. Dep’t of Revenue. Petition,
Nelson v. Kan. Dep’t of Revenue, No. 13C1465 (Kan. Dist. Ct. Dec. 30, 2013).
244. See supra note 201 and accompanying text.
245. See, e.g., Answer at 8, Nelson v. Kan. Dep’t of Revenue, No. 13C1465 (Kan. Dist. Ct.
Feb. 3, 2014) (stating that Notice 13-18, instructing same-sex taxpayers on filing status, is not
subject to rulemaking requirements).
246. See supra notes 173 and 175 and accompanying text.
247. KAN. STAT. ANN. §77-415(b)(2)(D) (2014).
248. See Bruns v. Kan. State Bd. of Technical Professions, 877 P.2d 391, 395 (Kan. 1994)
(holding that a “rule” or “regulation” is a policy that is of general application and has the effect
of law).
249. See, e.g., Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000) (holding that agency
interpretations such as those in opinion letters, policy statements, agency manuals, and
enforcement guidelines, all of which lack the force of law, are not entitled to Chevron deference;
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state legislatures codify the tax rules provided by state tax agencies, as
250
Idaho’s has done, challenges based on administrative-rulemaking
procedures could be moot.
CONCLUSION
The post-Windsor IRS Ruling presents nonrecognition states
with choices—not just about whether to conform to or decouple from
the federal income tax system when it comes to same-sex taxpayers,
but about the possible ways to make such a policy change. Different
states have made different decisions, with some states opening
themselves up to legal challenges based on administrative-law and
constitutional equal protection principles.
This Note should provide some guidance for same-sex marriage
advocates seeking to challenge state tax provisions that prohibit
married same-sex couples from using a married filing status. A
taxpayer challenge based on state administrative-law and
constitutional equal protection principles might be the best strategy
for married same-sex taxpayers seeking to challenge nonrecognition
provisions in general.
This Note’s approach, however, is merely a starting point in the
development of a strategy for same-sex-marriage advocates to use in
challenging the disparate tax treatment of same-sex couples. The
coming months will undoubtedly witness additional litigation over the
post-Windsor state tax regulations, which will suggest additional
modifications to the approach set forth here. Even if the
nonconstitutional concerns diminish over time as state legislatures
specifically address the conformity issue, same-sex taxpayers can still
challenge agency actions for the current tax-filing season. State tax
treatment of same-sex marriage in nonrecognition states is a complex
and fast-developing issue, and any proposal must evolve in parallel
with related litigation.

such interpretations warrant only judicial “respect,” and only to the extent that they have the
“power to persuade” (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944))).
250. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.

